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## **DECLARATION**

This research thesis is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a degree in any other University or institution.

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Date: \_\_04/06/2020\_\_

## **DEDICATION**

This is work dedicated to God and my family for all the support they gave me during the entire research period. Thanks to all who supported me in the completion of this thesis, God bless you.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

My gratitude is to the almighty God for enabling me complete this thesis.

My parents and my siblings have been very keen and always encouraging me to finish this thesis.  
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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

|        |   |
|--------|---|
| AIDS   | Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome        |
| AMISOM | African Union Mission in Somalia          |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| IMF    | International Monetary Fund               |
| NATO   | North Atlantic Treaty Organization        |
| NEPAD  | New Partnership for African Development   |
| RAF    | Russian-African Forum                     |
| SADC   | Southern African Development Community    |
| UK     | United Kingdom                            |
| UN     | United Nations                            |
| UNSC   | United Nations Security Council           |
| US     | United States                             |
| USSR   | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics       |

## **CHAPTER ONE: THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA IN AFRICA**

### **1.1 Background to the Study**

During the years of 2000s there was a resurgence of the interests of Russia in the continent of Africa. According to Pajon (2017) the renewal arose within Russia framework of new foreign policy, that started to develop during late 1990s and recently consolidated. After encountering a wonderful age in the periods of USSR, mostly in 1960s, the relationships between Africa and Russia considerably decline with the fall of USSR. Whereas Russia has not at one time withdrawn from Africa, its engagement in the continent regressed at the preliminary years. The early 1990s happened to be years that Russia made efforts of developing relationships with the West while withdrawing from the continent of Africa (Ramani, 2016).

According to Mehmet (2018) failure to accomplish the momentum desired in its relationships with the West, Russia started to develop a bigger scale, multi-dimensional policy incorporating the former geography of Soviet and Middle East originally, and Latin America, Africa and China after that (Oldberg, 2017). The process, that grew a fresh momentum in the course of the era of President Vladimir Putin in 2000s, has radically developed with the increase in prices of oil and the impact of a cooperative global structure. The agenda and priorities of the geopolitics of Russia have grown towards developing a contemporary geo-economical understanding because of its developing economy, foreign investments and trade in this fresh period (Mehmet, 2018).

According to Korybko (2016) the political involvement of Russia in Africa diminishes as compared to how it has invested in the continent of Asia. From his first tenure in governance, Vladimir Putin has visited nations in Asia towards developing bilateral relationships. Africa happened to just be of only negligible significance to him. In the priorities hierarchy of Russia, the High North and Arctic are amongst the tactical interests of Kremlin, partly as a result of natural resources that can be extracted there and the presence of the military of Russia in the region Murmansk. Africa, in the meantime, conquers a second tier, as a result of its restrained economic projections and the outstanding impact of the past European colonial forces (Klomegah, 2016).



There was hope for Russia to look for such alliances in the continent, despite that Africa is now an item of stiff competition between the past colonial forces and emerging nations, counting Russian alliances like Israel, Turkey, Brazil, China and India. The authorities of Russia are as well searching for fresh economic and financial resources which cannot be reached by the American and the European Sanctions. Therefore, after a sudden disconnection in early 1990s, Russia seemed to re-experience Africa's attractions. The Soviet Union had heavily invested both economically and politically (De Waal, 2015).

### **1.1.1 Russian African Economic Relation from 2000 to 2020**

The perception of Russia concerning Africa had started to transform with regard to the context of fresh state priorities and values in the 21st Century (Abbink, 2016). Russia begun establishing close relationships with the nation of Angola, a past ally. Deputy Foreign Minister V. Sredin stated, the relationships between Angola and Russia were advancing to the strategic alliance stage (Polikanov and Deich, 2014). Since 2001 to 2005, the interest of Russia on Africa started to grow, and the relationships of Africa and Russia gained a favorable dynamism. During 2001, the heads of nations of Nigeria, Egypt, Guinea, Gabon and Algeria and Ethiopia's Prime Minister toured Moscow. During the meeting with Gabon head of state, O. Bongo, in 2001, Putin stated, Russia wished to start friendly relationships with every nation across the globe, and the continent of Africa was equally equivalent as any other area (Russian Presidential Press, 2001).

Russia took part in the Action Plan of Africa, that was acknowledged by G-8 nations in 2002 Kananaskis Summit that took place in Canada. The Business Council of Russia to Africa was established in 2002, having to engage sixty businessmen who happened to be active in tourism, finance and gas industries of the continent. Planned in 2006, the business forum for South Africa and Russia was conducted as amongst the Expo-Russia organizers. Despite that it did not have serious attendance till 2008, the council tends to be rebuilding itself. The ambassador of Russia to Ethiopia was indorsed to AU commission in 2005. Relationships were propelled with SADC, whereby South Africa pursues a core role and also the ECOWAS, whereby Nigeria serves a core role. It was easy to observe Russia rising interest on Africa amongst Russian economic and political circles in 2006 and 2007 (Pittelli & Pirio, 2015). Putin toured South Africa, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt in-2006. These tours happened to be their first to experience, since Putin was recorded as the 1<sup>st</sup> leader from Russia who visited the Sub Saharan Africa.

The tours by Putin to the continent, counting Morocco and South Africa, were actually a clear message for the world that indeed Russia is to come back in Africa where it earlier on had geopolitical interests. Russia happens to be doing that in a significantly fresh way. In representative terms, since Morocco and South Africa were situating on the opposite far edges of Africa, Putin sent a message that indeed the whole of the region was of significance to Russia (Shedrin, 2016). South Africa became significant country for piloting for expansion of Russia in Africa as well as its relationships with Africa, the business spheres of Russia chose the nation as a basis for expansion in Africa.

Russia Foreign Ministry went on to offer political-diplomatic aid to firms by the Russia operational in Africa. Based on the figures of year 2007, the investment of Russia in Africa's Sub-Saharan region was \$1.5 billion. The volume of trade by Russia with those nations increased by a twenty percent, exceeding \$1.3 billion. In 2007, 4,500 students of Africa went for education within the state of Russia, and a 50 % were financed by the state of Russia from the national budget (Korybko, 2016). 800 fellowships funded by the state were set aside for students of Africa in the budget of years 2007-2008. Aid was situated to fight malaria and AIDS in Africa. Financial and Humanitarian assistance was given to DRC Congo, Kenya, Guinea, Sudan, Mali and Somalia as well as other Countries (Mungai, 2016).

In the security sector, Russia has helped in the stabilization of the situation in Central African Republic where a Russian Security Company, the Wagner Group is active. In 2014, Russia was able to beat both UK and US in supplying arms to Nigeria to fight Boko Haram. Russia has signed military arrangements with almost two dozen countries in Africa. However, its actual presence on the ground is small compared to those of France or the US (Öztürk, 2016).

On 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> October 2019, Russia had its Russia- Africa Economic Forum in Sochi. The Summit was co-chaired by the Russian President Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President and African Union Chairman Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi. According to the Russian Presidential Press, (2019), all 54 African states sent a representative to the meeting, including 43 heads of state or government, according to Kremlin advisor. For Russia, the Summit was more than just trade and investments. Russia-Africa bilateral trade, which doubled in the last five years stands today at about US\$20 billion. This is miniscule compared to other partners like China, US, Europe, India

and Japan, only 3.7% of Russian exports end up in Africa with 2.7% going to North Africa (Sergunin, 2019).

African goods account for only 1.1% of Russian imports (Korybko, 2016). Putin announced at the Summit that trade would be doubled in the next four or five years. Trade in mineral resources particularly manganese and chromium will be very important for Russia. However, the partnerships in other sectors are set to boom particularly in areas of Russian strength. These will be in sale of arms, security, oil and gas sectors, Nuclear energy, mining and diamond industry. The Summit came up with a final Declaration of 47 paras dealing with the mechanisms of Partnership, Political Cooperation, Security Cooperation, Trade and Economic Cooperation, Scientific, Technical, Humanitarian and Information Cooperation and Cooperation in Environmental Protection (Öztürk, 2016).

All these developments pointed to Russia acknowledgement of Africa growing role in the contemporary world as well as Russia desire to participate in the resolution of international problems on the continent in order to create a multi-polar world system (Emelyanov, 2017). according to Kazibwe, (2018), Russia has been coming back to Africa slowly, but changing conditions invalidated past methods of engagement.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Russia return to Africa raises one main question. What motivates the economic return of Russia to Africa? The study also seeks to answer other three questions. First, is it solely the result of a windfall effect or is it, rather, the product of a well thought-through strategy, like Russia's pivot to Asia, that started in Vladimir Putin's first term? Secondly, how has Russia's economic return manifested itself: in diplomacy, the military sphere, natural resources or the economy? Lastly, how does Russia's Africa economic policy work alongside those of other powers that were already active on the African continent? This paper thesis attempt to start answering these questions. First, it is beyond doubt that Russia's economic return to Africa is much more modest than recent media coverage would have one believe. Second, the tools used by Russia uses point to indirect action and influence executed by certain private and state actors. Third, Russia's prospects in Africa probably rest on two pillars, military-technical cooperation and the exploitation of natural resources.

### **1.3 Research Justification**

The research will give a discussion on how the relationships between Africa and Russia have grown since the USSR collapsed in 1991, as well it will aim at answering the reason for changes within the relations. When USSR shrunk, there were institutional and political changes in Russia that resulted to the continent no longer to be believed as an area of priority. To consider the relations of modern day between Africa and Russia, the research will assess multilateral and bilateral involvements between Africa and Russia through certain examples with attempts of narrowing the study's focus.

The examples are going to give a deeper profundity of relationships amid Moscow and Africa, and give an insight on the overall attributes of multilateral and bilateral engagements of Russia with the continent. First, they are going to do a documentation of the engagement process, do an analysis and generalize on them. The Bilateral involvements between Africa and Russia are going to be assessed through a cooperation study in the sector of energy, military and mining amongst others.

### **1.4 Research Methodology**

The research aims at examining, through literature analysis and review, of how the multilateral and bilateral economic relationships between Africa and Russia have advanced from when the Cold War ended. The study is to depend on the secondary sources; internet sources, articles from the newspaper, journals, books that are published counting the official and state documents; and unofficial discussions with well-known scholars of Russia. Primarily, the study is going to be an exploratory research which will aim at describing the manner in which contemporary and historical events amongst Africa and Russia have happened and waits on Africa with the transformed relationships with Russia.

Secondary data is to undergo serious analysis as well as interpretation for purposes of examining the documents accuracy and relevance for this study's purposes. Analysis of qualitative data is to be conducted by use of content analysis for purposes of reducing the broad information variety to quite a limited combination of features constituting a variable.

## **CHAPTER TWO: RUSSIA'S RENEWED ECONOMIC INTERESTS ON AFRICAN STATES**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This section analyses the economic return of Russia to Africa. The chapter analyses the background of Russia in Africa from the cold war period to the current period. The chapter further analyses Russia's renewed economic interests in African States where the study will have several case studies from the Horn of Africa. The section also assesses the social and economic gains that this relationship brings to both Russia and the African Continent.

### **2.2 Background of Russia and Africa Relations**

Soviet Union-Africa relations covers the diplomatic, political, military and cultural relationships between the Soviet Union and Africa, from the 1945 to 1992 (Schulz, 2011). The USSR was the sociopolitical supporter, ally and role model of different African customer nations aiming at getting freedom and self-determination and also diplomatic influence in the fight between the East and the West (Oldberg, 2017). This Unions taking part in the Continent of Africa contributed to the cessation of racism and colonialism in Africa, and aiding at putting square the issues related to Africa on the global agenda. Though conflicting to the former colonial powers, that provided Africa the Francophone, Lusophone and Anglophone regions long-term Eurocentric traits of culture, the USSR didn't make a lot of impression or footmark in the continent of Africa (Korybko, 2016).

Nonetheless, Russia did enjoy the benefit to engage Africa with no incapacitating chip of the colonialist on them (Klomegah, 2015). The USSR invested significantly in promoting strategic geopolitical relationships with liberal governments within the southern hemisphere that is underdeveloped, specifically Africa. Relationships between Russia with freshly independent nations specifically benefitted from the true anticolonial position of Moscow through supporting the course of liberation at UN, significant material aid to movements of liberation, technical and economic aid. Different future leaders of Africa obtained their education in the USSR (Aggarwal & Govella, 2017).

### **2.2.1 The Cold War Period**

During the Cold War, Moscow provided Africa with a better competitive edge with the US. According to Pirio and Pittelli (2015) Moscow's fast and huge growth of their relationships with the nations in Africa started from late 1950s and early 1960s, where they happened to be attaining independence in turn (Emelyanov, 2017). As well, for the movement that was Non-Aligned, it gave the other states of Africa an impetus of encouraging them to attain independence, therefore, USSR did show its support to Bandung Conference decisions concerning them as anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist, and contended for peaceful survival which entailed respect for sovereignty, state integrity and non-intervention in states of internal affairs. In 1956, Khrushchev stressed the essence of the end of imperialism system and professed the irreconcilable fight of USSR in contrast to colonialism at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party (Davies & Ball, 2015). Supporting fights for social advancement and nationwide liberation was targeted in 1977 Constitution of Soviet as an objective of foreign-policy (Shubin & Arkhangelskaya, 2015).

The foreign policy of Soviet Union and America on Africa brought more battles in the 1970s decade. Not accidentally, in 1970 to the 1980s Africa tended to be the ground for robust competition between USSR and U.S. for authority in local forward military presence (Davies & Ball, 2015). The US interests may be described on the basis of securing tactical points for instance the Persian Gulf and Suez Canal. Thus, it was US interest to inhibit any extension of Soviet influence and power, whether by no or with representatives, in Africa, Indian Ocean and Middle East (Mesfn, 2018) Nonetheless, superpower competition wasn't just the sole aspect for Africa's Soviet activism.

USSR employed military support as being the quite effective way to gain cooperation and influence. During 1962, Moscow offered \$32 million credit to the Somali for purposes of raising a sum of 14,000 soldiers and reform the army (Nordiska Africa institute, 2017). During 1965, USSR provided military and technical aid for building Somalis Navy. Conversely, USSR as well made efforts of assisting the state armed forces of Ethiopia. Mengistu Haile Mariam, as a Marxist leader as well played a significant role in boosting of assistance on Ethiopia. In 1976, \$100 million secret military convention was signed amongst the 2 sides (Kazibwe, 2018).

Approximately 20 000 Ethiopian underwent training in USSR, and many did graduate from the political and military schools (Vasilyev, & Korendyasov, 2013),

USSR provided economic acclaims close to every state in Africa, but couldn't encourage their usage. In the era of Cold war, USSR did sign several agreements consisting the cultural, economic, military and some Fields with a big number of nations in Africa (Korybko, 2016). Within the field of education, Soviets as well did training for about 200,000 professionals at least on the soil of Africa. USSR did make consensus with the 37 African states on economic and technical aid, and with the forty-two nations on the trade consensus (Laruelle, 2019). As well, approximately 25,000 Africans did train in the universities of Soviet in different fields, and a big number of them did graduate from the Soviet political and military schools (Shubin & Arkhangelskaya, 2015).

### **2.2.2 Lost Years: Post-Cold War Period**

The end of the Soviet Union interrupted the relations of the African and Russian nations. The relationships with the Africa Countries became amongst the last grounds amongst priorities of foreign policy. During 1992, Russia shut doors of 4 consular offices and 9 embassies and many cultural centers and missions wiped out on the region (Shubin & Korendyasov, 2019). Conversely, in particular it was accepted during 1990s that mass media of Africa stated insisting on the topic that Russia left Africa in a pity (Deich 2019). During this time, the validity of the Soviet Model was lost, and no fresh model existed at the moment for proposition (Aras & Fidan, 2017).

Nonetheless, the failure of USSR economy during 1990s may solely not describe the deteriorating essence of Africa, further the psychological aspect contributed significantly. The Russian Pro-Western media maintained negative positions toward the continent of Africa being a victim for the problems, accusing Africans of being a huge burden to the economy of Russia (Lo, 2018). Truly, the economic coordination with the African states was correspondingly advantageous. However, the assertions on Africa evidenced as dangerous and damaging, since they heartened intolerance and xenophobia expressions (Shubin & Arkhangelskaya, 2013).

### **2.2.3 Putin's Era**

According to Shubin (2010) Yeltsin era is deemed as a decade lost on the basis of the Russia's Africa policy by a big number of researchers. During the previous duration of the Yeltsin, the useful transformation started by appointing Yevgeny Primakov as a Foreign Minister and later on Prime Minister on January the year 1996. The disruption in the relationships between Africa and Russia became quite dynamic with the purpose of returning to the area, promoted by the increasing interests of Brazil, India, China and the US in particular on Africa for purposes of securing accessibility to the energy reserves and national resources (Giles, 2013).

Since the start of 21st century, there were a number of official visits to Russia by the foreign ministers and leaders of the African states including Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya. Then consequently, the Ministers of the Russian Government and some officials paid visits to the African nations (Lo, 2018). Beyond thirty political meetings with the diplomatic departments of the states of Africa were held in 2005 to 2006. The leadership of Russia expanded cooperation with regional organisations of Africa, mainly, with AU. In 2006, Russia hosted the G8 Summit. Based on St. Petersburg Summit, there was approval of a document concerning Update on Africa. Problems of Africa were as well discussed in the Summits primary documents and the ultimate press brief by President Putin (Abramova & Fituni, 2016).

According, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2018), President Vladimir Putin beckoned the intention of Russia towards expanding business relations with the region. In 2007, Putin went on to showing the interest of Russia to Africa with the G-8 summit and stated that the answer to the energy troubles of Africa would result to development of the region (Laruelle, 2019). Putin gave credit through a message to the governments and presidents of Africa on the Africans Liberation Day celebrations. During that year, a document was published by the Foreign Ministry of Russia. A deep observation on the Foreign Policy of Federation of Russia that pointed out a fresh dynamism begun to occur in Russia-Africa development of traditional pleasant relationships and established the Africa's significance to Russia (Aras & Fidan, 2016).

In 2008 concept of Foreign Policy signed up by Dmitry Medvedev, Africa happened to be 9<sup>th</sup>, then Latin America followed, on a list of 10 most significant sections for the interests of Russia



in the document of 2008 (Sergunin, 2016). The Foreign Policy Concept of Federation of Russia, that Vladimir Putin did sign in 30/12/2016 and as well as the earlier 2013 version. Essentially, this Concept repeated past promises through a declaration that the Russia was going to extend relationships with the nations of Africa in different areas in the multilateral and bilateral settings through enhancing political dialogue and stimulating jointly beneficial economic and trade relations, enhancing deep cooperation which serves the common interests, contributing to prevention of area conflicts and situational crisis, and also facilitating settlement after conflicts in Africa (Klomegah, 2015).

According to Nordiska Africa Institute (2017), stimulating partnership relationships with AU and a sub-regional such ECOWAS was key component of the policy. Another essential document entails the Russia's National Security Russian Federation to 2020, which Vladimir Putin approved in the year 2009, almost abandons the entire Africa (Klomegah, 2015). However, the fresh edition of the document, which Vladimir Putin approved in the year 2015, indicates, the Russia Federation is augmenting military-technical, political and trade collaboration and coordination in the field of security, and also humanitarian and educational contacts with Latin America and Africa countries and with relations of these nations, shows fresh techniques to Africa's continent with the position of transforming and Russia's statue in worldwide order as a power that is growing once more since the happenings of war in Ukraine and Syria (Cunningham & Roth, 2015).

### **2.3 Russia's Renewed Economic Interests on African States**

After the Cold War ended, mainly over the previous 10 years, the status of Africa in the global order of geopolitics has dramatically risen (Öztürk, 2016). While substantial consideration has been focused to China, India's role and other new power in Africa's continent, the return of Russia to the theatre of operations of the Cold War has often been overlooked, except from few regional experts who are yet to overlook it. In general, Russia has several interests in Africa's continent (Fidan & Aras, 2017).

Today, the position of Russia in the global system tends to be distinct from Cold War. As well, as the era of Yeltsin. Presently, Africa policy by Russia does not just pay interest to the volume and rate of flow of the natural resources, economic and trade association but as well pays focus

in matters of humanitarian for instance education and peace combined with security concerns. Regardless of the capacity of natural resources and the geopolitically tactical locality, Africa tends to be amongst the regions linked with a lot of problems or challenges with political uncertainties, economic pressures, regional conflicts. According to Öztürk (2016), the major social and economic pointers of the nations within the area clearly outline these actualities. Despite that there is widespread poverty across the area, the region should be amongst the richest world regions on the basis of sporadic metals and oil

Economically, the transformed interest of Russia in Africa stands clear. In Tsarist Russia and SU years, the region was properly known as a result of its richness in affordable or cheap raw materials like cotton, livestock, honey and grain (Ramani, 2016). Currently, Russia grows increasingly confident within their objectives on foreign policy, that truly Africa needs Russia and Russia needs Africa. According to Giles, (2013) presently Russia, tends to be the main natural gas and oil exporter and producer, doesn't require fresh energy supplies from the continent of Africa. However, for purposes of enhancing control over natural gas and oil lines to aid its sole political and economic influence is quite significant strategically across the globe. According to Vardanean (2018) Russia continues to put efforts to enhance its economic status from the international financial problem, as a result of the available sanctions and more priorities of foreign policy. With respect to that, the relationship of Africa is still in a level that is undesirable. Losing the influence of the period of Cold War to the US and China, probably Moscow is going to be focused on investing, political alliance and arms trades with the continent of Africa with respect to the natural resources on the proximate period (Sergunin, 2019).

## **2.4 Case studies of Russia Relations in The Horn of Africa**

### **2.4.1 Russia and Ethiopia-Eritrea-Sudan Triangle**

Other analysts and researchers have contended that the continent of Africa is slowly turning to Russia's new target for its international aggressiveness; its economic and military activity in Africa's continent are often concealed, however, through Russia's aggression in Ukraine including the annexation of Crimea as well as their military aid of Bashar al-Assad, Syria's president (Pitelli & Pirio, 2015). Therefore, it's crucial that to have economic and military cooperation with the countries that have undergone sanctions like Sudan. Establishment of good relations by Russia with Sudan and Eritrea particularly and actors of Africa may be considered a

challenge to the reestablishment of geopolitical effect in Red Sea/Suez Canal like in the conflict of the US-Soviet Cold War (Korybko, 2016).

The long-haul goal of the foreign policy by Moscow is a multi-polar global system focused on disputing the unrestricted impact of international forces in the continent of Africa, particularly China and US. A sanction in UNs Security Council (UNSC) is the major power level of Russia in global affairs for regions in Africa. The vote of Russia in contrast to imposing arms bans and sanctions on the nations of Africa offers to penetrate to the future prospective market of arms. Russia happens to be the 2<sup>nd</sup> biggest exporter of arms internationally following the US which is number one (SIPRI, 2016).

Using the arms vending like an entry means, Russia has constantly remained active in reestablishing business relationships, political and military relations in the entire Africa. Moscow has constantly been employing this method or arms vending being their number one and then on concerns of business in many African nations like Sudan and Eritrea (Woodward, 2016). In the year 2016, Somalia, a recognized Soviet ally, asked for equipment with Russia's military against the Al-Shabaab. Additionally, to the military coordination of Russia with Eritrea and Sudan in the region of Africa, Russia has continued to ask for Egypt, an additional old ally of USSR (Klomegah, 2016).

Given the rising impact of Russia's military forces in the country of Syria together with the Egyptian, Sudanese and Eritrean cooperation, it can be evidenced that Russia inclines to cultivate a powerful presence across Suez Canal and the Red Sea (Pitelli & Pirio, 2015). Enhancing relationships with nations in Africa has continuously gained significance for the nation of Russia, though quarrels between the states in the region has uncovered the query on what nation have a main concern for Russia (Vardanean, 2018). Regardless of the fact that Eritrea and Sudan have enhanced political and economic ties, drawing Ethiopia means being within the best path to win Africa generally, especially in competition with China. Russian strategic investments in the futuristic energy sector of Ethiopia may open gates for an improved association between 2 historically sociable nations and therefore should explain the intention of the reengagement of Moscow with Addis Ababa. As Korybko (2016) pointed out, in the international context of enhanced pattern to multi-polarity, Ethiopia might as a possibility be a dependable anchor within

Africa for purposes of establishing a visible and concrete presence in the region for the urgent demands of Russia.

#### **2.4.2 Russia and Somalia**

Somalia happens to be another alternative with its position geopolitically for the nation of Russia to benefit old impact in Africa (Suslov, 2017). Somalia happened to be a recognized Soviet ally since it had a government that was Marxist-Leninist in the course of the Cold war. Currently, neither is there ideological nor cultural similarity between these ex-allied countries. Somalia, through its unexploited uranium, gas, oil and more mineral resources, as well as prolonged uncertainty, is the regions miniature and needs a strategic alliance to aid in rebuilding the nation in each sense of the word (Davies & Ball, 2015). In 2016, Somalia's Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke carried out a combined meeting with Sergei Lavrov Russia's Prime minister. Sharmarke asked for aid from Russia to boost the military's capacity of Somali towards fighting Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab affiliate terror organization grounded in the East Africa and seeing the support of Russia in the growing economy of the nation. In that meeting, Lavrov stated that Russia is prepared to put into consideration military collaboration to aid Somalia in battling terrorism within the antagonistic region (Sputnik News, 2016).

Ramani (2016) states that while Syria is essential in the anti-ISIS efforts of Russia in the current months, the Sharmarke demand may change Somalia to an imminent theater for Russia's campaigning of the anti-ISIS with other actors. Obviously, direct or indirect economic and military aid to the government of Somalia can bring about an environment that is highly optimistic for the security of the region (Raviot, 2018). As well, it might boost the superpower position of Moscow as the leader as far as fighting terrorism is concerned besides the struggle counter to ISIS in the nation of Syria. Since the apology letter by president Erdoğan because of renewing and treating the wrecked relations through carpeting of 132 Mehmet Cem Oğultürk a jet that belonged to Russia by 2 Turkish F-16s near the boundary with Syria in the year 2015 (Cunningham & Roth, 2016).

The response of Russia in the 1<sup>st</sup> hours since the 2016 coup effort, and the assassination of the Ankara Ambassador of Russia, Karlov in 2016, openly has generated positive outcomes in the Russia-Turkey relationships alongside truce in the Syria (Malsin, 2016). The global community

is aware that Turkey has provided a noteworthy military and economic aid to the nation of Somalia. The first center of training the Military of Turkey abroad in overseas nation will as well be a significant base of providing training to Africa in general and probably is going to expand the influence of Turkey across the area (Stearns & Sucuoğlu, 2016). As well, the embassy of Djibouti is a representative of Somalia and Russia concomitantly, and it is easy to point out, Russia does not have any influence within Somalia. As relations between Russia and Turkey still hold as very pleasant, Turkey might support Russia towards improving the relation with the country of Somalia on security and economic collaboration (Ramani, 2016). Developing Russian economic as well as the military aids to Somalia might bring about noteworthy status and security benefits. According to Mungai (2019) the economic and the military aid of Russia to the nation of Somalia do not just pursue an impactful role towards restoration of stability and peace in Africa but as well will boost claims that the nation of Russia is the intensifying power once more.

### **2.4.3 Russia and Djibouti**

According to Nordiska Africa institute (2017) Djibouti tends to be the very significant Country with low demographic and occupies quite a small country, inadequate resources, but possess great tactical precedence and importance. That state is quite stable as compared to their neighbors battling threats to do with terrorism and piracy across Red Sea, Bab Al-Mandab canal and Gulf of Aden, and as well conflicts in Yemen and Somalia (Öztürk, 2016). The strategic importance of Djibouti as well obtains from the actuality that it's the significant, and at times the sole, port for nations that are land-locked in Africa, for instance South Sudan and Ethiopia. As well, the Eritrea-Ethiopia war elevated Djibouti's tactical importance. Though prior to that war the US had the hopes of building increased collaboration with Eritrea and Ethiopia as compared to Djibouti, this particular war interrupted the status. Thus, the US deemed Djibouti to be a significant ally as a result of the intensifying threats of terrorists in Africa (Woodward, 2016).

In addition, to French and Americas presence, Germany and Japan are maintaining their manifestation in Djibouti. Whereas China holds tactical interests across the area, it seems more focused on the investments (Aluwaisheg, 2015). Also, it supports that China has currently built a railroad between Djibouti and Addis Ababa's port, meaning that Russia uses the 'African Silk Road to augment its personal economic relations in the region and establishing tactical

comprehensiveness to non-Western economic development plan (Korybko, 2015). Conversely, Russians have made efforts but encountered failure in convincing Djibouti towards establishing a base, though African Intelligence proclaimed that the nation of China requested Russia to enable the aircraft carrier of Russia, Admiral Kuznetsov land at their base, in order for it to position its vessel to the nation of Syria for a short duration in the course of summer. This happened to be a great problem from the fresh intensifying powers to the Western and US club in the area.

#### **2.4.4 Russia and Uganda**

Uganda is landlocked country and relies on imports from overseas for a big number of the consumer products and requirements on energy (Woodward, 2016). Currently, Uganda tends to be amongst the developing nations in Africa with freshly discovered natural resources. Oil in Uganda gives it an opportunity of transforming the nation to a significant economic command within the area (Global Security, 2015). The nation holds a favorable relationship with the nation of Russia from the era of the USSR. During Museveni's, Uganda's president, visit in the year 2012, Russia showed its zeal to develop military and technical collaboration in the energy industry and infrastructure projects of Uganda (The Voice of Russia, 2012). Conversely, Uganda has pleaded for aid from Russia for developing nuclear power for boosting their capacity of production to back planned sectors under their Vision 2040 program of development (Mungai, 2016).

According to Pirio and Pittelli (2019), Russia seems keener in sharing its proficiency and the nuclear knowhow as compared to the other owners of nuclear knowhow and is an important tool for development for the nations that experience poverty of energy. Additionally, there exists approximately above 40,000 Ugandans that did study in the nation of Russia and have the capacity of reading and writing using the Russian linguistic (Chimpreports, 2016). That is an important cultural custom from the Soviets to Russia towards improving its persuasive power within the area. Nonetheless, since the Bill Clinton, the president of the US labelled Sudan to be the country that sponsored the terror, Uganda placed itself to be an associate in the forefront of the International fight on error. Approximately 20,000 residents of Uganda served in the military centers of the US in the Iraq and above 6,000 keepers of peace in the nation of Somalia are still a portion of AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, 2016). Regardless of the evolving relationships in the tactical region as nuclear power and natural resources, it isn't easy seeing Uganda becoming

a tactic alliance of the nation of Russia in Africa, as a result of relationships with the US and the country's position geopolitically.

#### **2.4.5 Russia Participation in Anti-Piracy Operation in the Gulf of Aden**

According to Roth and Cunningham (2015) about 12 per cent of the petroleum in the world passes across the Gulf of Aden, that is amongst the world's most significant waterways. The piracy attacks mostly impact on the interests of many nations, counting the destination, transshipment and cargo owner nations (Mekuriyaw, 2016). The contest against pirates within Gulf of Aden have continued to be conducted as part of 2008 NATO operation Ocean Shield and the EU Naval mission Atlanta developed in the year 2009 (Sputnik News, 2015).

Russia established its operation on fighting piracy in 2008 (Raviot, 2018). The Navy in that country announced positioning of Baltic Fleet frigate Neustrashimy having the indicated mission to ensure security across several areas of the universe oceans and protect the citizenry of Russia and the vessels. The essence of this activity is that Russia has preferred conducting activities impartially of any known task-force, though deems itself as supporting global attempts on fighting piracy (Oldberg, 2017). Regardless of not engaging in international task force on fighting piracy, the naval vessels of Russia positioned at Gulf of Aden allegedly manage their activities with some warships that operate in that area. The Russia's marine vessels positioned in that region excellently escorting huge amounts of the commercial vessels, including ships which aren't Russian through the Somali waters in which pirates have infested (MIT, 2009).

#### **2.5 Theoretical Review**

Theoretical context neoliberals and Neorealists are in agreement that the nation is an entity that has self-interests and the dominating player in the global system (Malsin, 2016). Both techniques have an assumption that global behavior patterns are described by the material powers. Nonetheless, an attention purely grounded on material is not going to describe why nations serve as they happen to. For instance, neither neoliberalism nor neorealism can describe the reason as to why US is supposed to see the missiles of North Korea as being a threat as compared to the British missiles, because a nuclear attack in US could cause a similar destruction irrespective of if it arose from Britain or North Korea. Pure focus on material this doesn't fully account as to the reason why other nations are considered friends and some as enemies. The disadvantage in the

liberal and neorealist theories opened ways for the approach of constructivist in global relationships after Cold War (Lyons, & Samatar, 2015).

Constructivism maintains, social relationships and ideas are the ones that enable the interests of a state and power to have an impact which they have (Liska, 1980). Constructivists credit the systems structure, though contend that ideas and beliefs are significant when putting into consideration what adds to the actions and interests of the nation, as the material forces and the interest of the state are principally formed through social relationships and ideas. In addition, the interests of the state are stimulated through identity, particularly the inter-intuitively instituted configuration of the systems interests and identities. As noted by Ian Hurd (2015), both constructivism and realism may be employed as methods of examining power relationships, but in a case where those 2 vary is the focus of realism on material forces, whereas constructivism accentuates the social implication which is linked to practices or objects. Therefore, implication is thus constructed socially in the approach of the constructivist. To constructivists, the global system cannot exist in isolation, but happens to be a portion of the public understanding or group of ideas amongst players (Laruelle, 2019).

Debatably, this pursuit for acknowledgment and capacity of shaping the international order tend to be the major facilitators of the foreign policy of Russia, and its political and economic activities (Mehmet, 2018). Africa mirrors a chance for Russia towards aiding these global objectives. State and Power interests are definitely significant, rendering realism important for putting into consideration the general foreign policy of Russia based on the emphasis of Kremlin on politics of power and relationships and state security, as well as its constant pursuit to counterbalancing the US supremacy (Lyons & Samatar, 2015). Truly, Russia isn't extraordinary on this since all the nations can be deemed as seeking power as well as dominating in other ways on their pursuit to survival. Nonetheless, realism focusing on material as well as its supposition that the interests of a nation as provided are inadequate in the theoretical context. A widely constructivist context is quite relevant because 1) the essence in the foreign policy of Russia of the identity, discourse, ideas, self-perception role and the manner in which Russia is believed as by other nations 2) as a result of the inclusion of identity and culture are significant causal aspects which aid in defining interests and constituting players which shape the policies of the state security and international insecurities (Lefebvre, 2012).



Constructivism states, ideational configurations (shared beliefs, values and ideas) maintain as much significance as the material ones and exploring how the ideas impact the world of materials (Lo, Bobo, 2013). In addition, it assumes, the international relations study is supposed to lay attention on beliefs and ideas which inform players on the global scene. This research doesn't aim at applying or testing theory; instead, in the perspective of the core role offered to status and identity, it is going to follow a widely constructivist method in debating the Russian economic relationships with the continent of Africa.

## **2.6 Chapter Summary**

To summarize, the economic return of Russia to Africa tends to be quite modest more than a person can believe through listening to the government of Russia or International and Russian media. As well, it is linked to the local economic challenges: large firms, and also small and medium enterprises have a crucial necessity of exporting to the markets which aren't exposed to sanctions. At the moment Russia is in need of Africa as compared to how much Africa is in need of Russia, specifically in terms of the massive natural resources of Africa. In one side, Moscow is going to constantly look for fresh contracts. In the other side, it's going to search for diversifying its supply sources in products of agriculture as well as other types of foodstuffs for purpose of circumventing traditional means which fall in the sphere of sanctions. Based on that, the continent of Africa is really significant. Thus it would be deemed as exaggeration attributing to Moscow a defined strategy towards weakening the West in the continent of Africa. Instead, it's moving to a great client relation with opportunistic and authoritarian regimes of Africa.

## **CHAPTER THREE: RUSSIA ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH AFRICA**

### **3.1 Introduction**

As Russia's economic strength started to reinvigorate in the late 1990s, the Russian foreign policy objective of reestablishing its geopolitical stature led to a renewal of its relations with Africa (Abbink, 2016). according to Korybko (2016) this was driven not only by political ambitions but also by economic and commercial motivations. The African continent, enriched by vast natural resources and with burgeoning consumer markets, has become a very attractive destination for Russian investment (Korendyasov & Shubin, 2019). The post-2000 Russian economic stability, which resulted in strong economic growth yearly average GDP growth rate of 6.9 percent, increasing demand for Russian exports mostly oil and other natural resources and higher foreign exchange reserves which is the world's third largest reserve (African Development Bank, 2011).

This presented an opportunity for the Russian government and business elites to expand their influence beyond Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States borders and to enhance their political and commercial ties with African countries and other emerging markets (Baev, 2018). This chapter will examine Russia's economic reengagement with African countries by quantifying trade between the two regions, analyzing the investment flows of Russian companies into Africa, and assessing the potentials of Russia's energy expertise for Africa's resource-rich countries.

### **3.2 Russia Africa Trade Relations**

The importance of Russia as a trading partner to African countries is quite minimal when compared to other developed countries and emerging markets such as the European Union, the United States, China, India, and Brazil. According to Ball & Davies (2015), bilateral trade between Russia and Africa reached its peak of US\$ 7.3 billion in 2008. Although this is close to a tenfold increase from the very low trade volume of US\$ 740 million in 1994, it is not significant enough to guarantee Russian companies a bargaining edge when engaging with African countries (Govella & Aggarwal, 2017). To improve its political and commercial ties with Africa and facilitate market access to its firms, the Russian government embraced a new foreign policy toward Africa, undertook high official visits to some African countries, and

advocated for conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, and debt relief for Africa. Russia remains an economic lightweight in Africa.

Since 2000, Russia's trade with Africa started to rise but with imports of African products increasing at a slower pace than Russian exports to the Africa continent (Grifths, 2015). Imports from Africa rose overall from US\$ 350 million in 2000 to US\$ 1.6 billion in 2009 while exports grew from US\$ 947 million to US\$ 4 billion over the same period (Crowley & Vuuren, 2014). According to Fituni and Abramova (2016) both exports and imports grew steadily from 2000 to 2008, after which they slightly decreased because of the impacts of the world financial and economic crisis. Russia has maintained a trade surplus with Africa, which stood at US\$ 597 million in 2000, rising to US\$ 3.3 billion in 2008 and falling to US\$ 2.3 billion in 2009 (De Waal, 2015).

In terms of arms sales, Africa remains a market to be conquered, even if Russia is already operating there. Figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that most (78%) of Russian arms transfers to Africa go to Algeria. Africa as a whole account for only 13% of Russian arms exports (Fainberg, 2017). Moreover, Russian exports of arms to Africa declined by 32% between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017. Roseboro export figures for 2011-2015 suggest that Russia accounts for about 30% of Sub-Saharan Africa's arms imports. These figures do not include certain maintenance contracts for Soviet equipment, which is still used in three quarters of African countries. For Russia, then, reconquering the African arms market merely means selling servicing or retrofitting contracts. In 2017, the body responsible for the whole sector and for Industrial and Technical cooperation, the FSMTS (Federal Service of Military-Technical Cooperation), announced that its order book was worth \$45 billion (Fidan & Aras, 2017). African countries which received Russian arms in 2017 include:

Algeria: four Iskander-E short range missile systems, six Su-30MKA combat aircraft, six Mi-28NE attack helicopters of 42 that were ordered in 2013, the first T-90SA heavy tanks, TOS-1 and BuK-M2E missile systems and awaiting a Kilo-class submarine.

Egypt: 46 MiG-29M/M2 multirole fighter aircraft, 19 Kamov-52 attack helicopters equipped with the AT-9 and AT-16 anti-tank systems, S-300 missile systems.

Kenya: One Mi-17 helicopter for the police.

Nigeria: Two Mi-35 helicopters.


Mali: Two Mi-35 helicopters ordered & to be delivered in 2019.

Angola: Retrofit of 18 Su-30K fighter aircraft.

Equatorial Guinea: automatic weapons, 12 E6-type surface-to-air missile systems and two Pantsir-S1 missile systems.

Burkina Faso: Two Mi-171 helicopters (Foreign Affairs Ministry of Russia's Federation, 2018).

According to Fainberg (2017), Russian imports from Africa are also concentrated in a few countries, namely Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa jointly these account for about 80 percent of Africa's exports to Russia. The exports from Africa are slightly more diverse and include ores, uranium, iron, and other concentrates of base metal, fruits and nuts, cocoa, tobacco, and inorganic chemical elements (Sputnik News, 2015). Although the import of African products increased at a compounded annual growth rate of 19 percent between 2000 and 2017, Africa still accounts for only 1 percent of Russia's world trade (De Waal, 2018).



This marginalized position of Africa vis-à-vis trade with Russia may reflect the country's long withdrawal from the continent following the end of the Cold War (Comins & Yermolaev, 2018). According to Baev (2018) it is unlikely to reverse because of Russia's growing interest to modernize its trade network by expanding its trade of machinery and equipment, and other technologies. At the current stage of its development and given the limited dynamics of its export base, Africa may not be in a position to meet Russia's trade interests (Abbink, 2016). Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that Russia's renewed interests in Africa has been fueled by

the crucial need to access foreign energy reserves as Russia runs the risk of exhausting its oil reserves should the current scale of national exploitation remain constant (Suslov, 2017).

According to African Development Bank (2015), Africa's rich untapped oil and natural gas reserves provide an opportunity for Russia's outbound exploration drive and strategic goal of remaining the world's largest exporter of oil second to Saudi Arabia and natural gas, and maintaining Europe's dependence on its export of natural gas. In 2009 oil, fuel and gas accounted for 67.4 percent of total exports from Russia, and more than three-fourths of its oil and gas exports went to Europe (Tralac, 2011). According to Ball and Davies, (2018) oil and gas account for 30 percent of Russia's GDP, and constitute more than 40 percent of government revenues. While the recent high oil prices are projected to keep the current account in surplus peaking at US\$ 103.7 billion in 2008, falling Russian oil reserves may slow down the strong economic growth experienced over the past ten years 6.9 percent increase on average per year (Vnesheconombank Press release, 2011).

While Russia's trade with Africa has increased in recent years its exports to Africa reached \$20 billion in 2018, double the level of trade in 2015 its economic involvement with the continent is dwarfed by countries such as the U.S., China, and France (Raviot, 2018). To begin to compete with these countries, Putin has promised cooperation without political or other interference.

### **3.3 Agriculture**

Since Russia's break with the West in 2014 and its imposition of countersanctions on food and agricultural products from the EU, it has looked to Africa as a source of substitute imports (Woodward, 2016). Russia is a primary export market for African citrus products, with trade rising steeply after 2014, particularly from Morocco. South Africa stepped up its exports of fish to Russia around the same time, largely in response to Russia's ban on Norwegian salmon and other European seafood. Russia is now among the world's largest grain exporters and sees potential markets in Africa for its wheat, dairy, poultry, and pork (Woodward, 2016).

Minister of Agriculture Dmitry Patrushev, the son of Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, traveled to Africa in 2018 in an effort to expand trade in food products and promote agricultural-sector cooperation (Wezeman & Bernaud, 2019). Growing agricultural trade between Russia and several African states has been accompanied by the entry of Russian

fertilizer producers into the sub-Saharan market. Russia's privately held Eurochem is planning to use sulfate of potash sourced in Eritrea to produce nitrogen, phosphate, and potassium fertilizers in its plants in Belgium and Russia. Uralchem and Uralkali reportedly are in talks to build fertilizer distribution hubs in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Uralchem is the prime candidate to buy a stake in Zimbabwe's troubled Chemplex fertilizer producer (Vardanean, 2018). As in the case of diamond mining, Zimbabwe's isolation from the West means that Russia can be an attractive business partner, which eases Russian fertilizer company's entry into the country.

### **3.4 Energy Resource Interests**

In 2009, Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia to become the world's number one exporter of oil. Russia holds the world's largest natural gas reserves. Gas, petroleum, and refined oil products account for two-thirds of Russian exports. Russian oil production is projected to grow by approximately 1.5-2.5 percent in the next 2 decades (Thompson & Sotala, 2014). However, the level of active reserves is constantly falling, while reserves that are difficult to access are rising. Therefore, to implement effectively Russia's energy policy and continue to support the annual budget, Russia must secure further oil and gas reserves.

Vagit Alekperov, the president of LukOil, one of Russia's leading oil companies actively engaged in Africa, has stated that "Russian-African cooperation could help in meeting the goals of Russia's energy strategy for 2030. Among other high-profile and high-cost Russian state projects, Russia's defense strategy and plans for military modernization depend in large part on energy revenue (Sputnik News, 2016). Yet for Russia, energy and defense are tied together in more ways than through budget financing. Russia links energy needs together with debt and exports of military equipment to cut beneficial deals in Africa. During Putin's high-profile visit to Algeria in 2006, a \$7.5 billion deal was signed for combat aircraft, missiles, and tanks, linked to the cancellation of \$5 billion of Algeria's Soviet-era debt and, during the same visit, Lukoil and Gazprom secured oil and gas concessions (Sergunin, 2019).

Meanwhile, Libya had committed to purchase \$2.5 billion of Russian arms, also linked to cancellation of \$4 billion of Soviet debt a significant factor on Dmitry Medvedev getting criticized for allowing this intervention to happen Libyan civil war in 2011 (Schulz, 2018). The attractions of Sub-Saharan African energy reserves for producers from Russia and elsewhere are

clear. Based on the U.S. Department of Energy Information Administration, Angola is the second largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa behind Nigeria, and recent exploration suggests that Angola's oil and natural gas reserves may be larger than initially estimated. Four geological provinces along the east coast of Africa have recently been assessed for undiscovered, technically recoverable, oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids resources as part of the U.S. Geological Surveys (USGS) World Oil and Gas Assessment (Roth, & Cunningham, 2015).

The USGS estimated mean volumes of 27.6 billion barrels of oil, 441.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 13.77 billion barrels of natural gas liquids (Ramani, 2016). Industry estimates of proved, probable and possible current producible reserves are roughly 35 billion barrels of crude oil and 151 trillion cubic feet of gas, and the USGS estimates that the Sub-Saharan region as a whole could hold 72 billion barrels of undiscovered resource potential. By 2030, Sub-Saharan Africa is predicted to account for 15-20 percent of total worldwide oil imports at about 2.5 million barrels per day (Pirio & Pittelli, 2019).

This is roughly one-fifth of the Middle East undiscovered potential (Oldberg, 2017). Although there is little consensus over the date at which Russian oil production will peak, lower production costs in Africa are attractive for Russian energy majors for short-term commercial as well as long-term energy security considerations. Significant investment would be required of Russia to explore, extract, and export the mostly untapped energy resources in Sub-Saharan Africa. Investment in oil and gas exploration, production, and infrastructure development for export also depends on the security and stability of the invested country (Nordiska Africa institute, 2017).

In many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, civil wars make investing in energy exploration even more problematic, especially over questions of claims to oil and/or gas fields, such as in Angola and Sudan (Mehmet, 2018). Between 1985 and 1991, civil war in Sudan forced all foreign oil companies with onshore concessions to either withdraw or suspend activity. In Sub-Saharan Africa, windfalls created by oil wealth have largely contributed to widespread corruption and abuse within African governments (Malsin, 2016). Oil export revenues account for a large proportion of gross domestic product, for example 40 percent in Nigeria and 85 percent in Equatorial Guinea. Much of this revenue is not funneled back into economies, maintaining poverty and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, and thus creating an unstable investment environment. This gives rise to potential concern over Russian involvement in African energy

projects: Europe's increasing consumption of energy and dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia puts pressure on the Kremlin to seek alternative sources of energy (Lyons & Samatar, 2015).

According to Lo, (2013), Africa, with its rich endowment of crude oil reserves, natural gas deposits, and other natural resources, is exerting a strong attraction for Russian energy companies. As Africa's comparative advantage in the scope and frequency of new discoveries is being courted by global energy consumption countries such as Russia, precautionary measures should be put in place to ensure that sustainable economic and social benefits accrue from natural resources exploitation (De Waal, 2015). While a significant consideration for Western energy companies, these problems have a demonstrably smaller deterrent effect for the huge Chinese involvement in energy extraction and production (Lo, 2018). The Russian approach to the balance between pure commercial realpolitik and sensitivity to humanitarian concerns in the energy-producing host state seems yet to be coherently determined, but is likely to fall between these two poles. As explained by one U.S. analyst: Energy security is now being given serious attention. case in point is how Russia and China view energy security (Kwinika, 2015).

In Russia, security for energy implies energy weaponing (Korybko, 2015). It's not a philosophy aiming at other future independent paradise of clean energy. Its today's doctrine, that handles the world based on how it is, addicted and vulnerable to dirty energy like coal, oil and natural gas and uses that self-reliance in making Russia sturdier (Emelyanov, 2017). With that skeptical manner of judging the world, more similar to the manner in which the drug lords of Columbia regard addicts of cocaine, Russia seeks a security for energy which is more foreign to that which majority of Americans vaguely think of it (Korendyasov & Shubin, 2019).

There are other features to Russian investment bids that could prove attractive to African nations, beyond the absence of political or ideological strings or of insistence on good behavior (Klomegah, 2015). Practical experience may also play a role: Russia's well-established expertise in extracting energy resources and advanced nuclear know-how presents a value-added opportunity for Africa. It is worth noting that Russia is participating in tenders for the construction of the first nuclear power plants in Egypt and Nigeria, which have significant uranium reserves (Emelyanov, 2017). Also, Russia's own experience with the problems that plagued its energy sector during the 1990s and its ability and knowledge to restructure the sector



for improved management and higher productivity, could provide a salutary lesson to be learned by African countries. At the same time, Russian investors may not be immune to the consequences of local disaffection (Kazibwe, 2016).

In 2009, The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) carried out an attack on an oil facility and immediately afterwards issued a statement directly addressing visiting Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, warning that this is the fate that awaits the gas pipelines you plan to invest in Nigeria if justice is not factored in the whole process (Fidan & 2017). The attack and statement came shortly after Gazprom had secured a \$2.5 billion investment deal in Nigeria, signed during the Medvedev visit (Grifths, 2015). As noted above, Russia's energy doctrine is designed to be expansionist, seeking control over resources to meet energy demands. Russia also needs to export natural gas and oil in order to support the Russian economy and enhance the dependence of other states on Russian energy reserves. With Russia supplying the EU with one-third of the energy it consumes, this can give rise to immediate concern in consumer countries (Francis, 2018). Given the differing approaches to, and even definitions of, energy security between Russia on the one hand and the U.S. and its Euro-Atlantic allies on the other, control of African energy resources by Russian majors should be observed closely and the long-term implications considered with as much attention as is given to similar acquisition programs by (China Govella, & Aggarwal, 2017).

### **3.5 Growing Interest of Russian Investors**

Africa's vast natural reserves make the continent an increasingly attractive investment destination for Russia's energy and other natural resource industries (Govella. & Aggarwal, 2017). On account of its strong economic growth, large external assets (US\$ 480 billion in foreign exchange reserves), increasing outward direct investment stock (from US\$ 3 billion in 1995 to US\$ 249 billion in 2009), and politico-strategic ambitions, Russia represents a major potential investor in African countries (Fituni & Abramova, 2016). At the same time, Russia's outward investment is dominated by large resource-based corporations that seek to gain greater access to the African market of fuel, energy and metallurgy, and expand Russian investment flows to Africa, which peaked at US\$ 20 billion in 2008 (Deich, 2014). As mentioned above, oil, gas and other natural resources sectors have been the major contributors to the Russian economic boom and increasingly, they dominate Russian outward investment (Fainberg, 2017). Therefore,

it is not surprising to see large Russian multinationals such as Lukoil, Gazprom, Norilsk Nickel, Alrosa, Rusal and Severstal invest in oil, gas, diamond, aluminum, iron ore and other metal products in many African countries including Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria, and South Africa (Fidan & Aras, 2017).

The motivation behind Russian business expansion in Africa is also driven by the depletion of the resources base in Russia (Comins & Yermolaev, 2015). The absence of new discoveries and technological advancement, which are weakening Russia's domestic energy, together with the lack of easy access to the remaining underground mineral deposits in Russia, are some of the factors leading Russian Africa's considerable natural resources (Fituni & Abramova, 2016). While Africa's share of global energy production is about 12 percent and increasing, its share of global commercial energy consumption is only 3 percent, which represents a significant supply for Russia's growing oil demand (Arkhangelskaya & Shubin, 2015). The high costs of accessing Russia's reserves of diamonds, uranium, gold, copper, nickel and other metals and their reduced economic viability given the volatility of these products world prices, have encouraged Russian firms to turn to Africa as an alternative source of supply, as the costs of exploration and production are much lower there (Abbink, 2016).

In fact, Africa's underexploited mineral reserves, which account for about 30 percent of global resources, will be strategic complementarities to Russia's depleting natural resource base, including zinc, diamond, gold, uranium, oil, copper, nickel, manganese, bauxite, and coal (Fainberg, 2017). Moreover, countries such as Algeria, Angola, Botswana, DRC, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia, which dominate the African mining industry, will potentially attract an increasing number of Russian business elites (African Development Bank, 2015).

### **3.6 Prospect for Russia's Reengagement with Africa**

Russia's involvement in Africa is not new; it heightened during the Cold War period, largely driven by the Kremlin's search for geostrategic advantage. After the Cold War, leading up to the 1990s, Russian foreign policy resulted in withdrawal from Africa's underexploited mineral reserves, which account for about 30 percent of global resources, will be strategic

complementarities to Russia's depleting natural resource base, including zinc, diamond, gold, uranium, oil, copper, nickel, manganese, bauxite, and coal (Deich, 2014).

As Russia began to return to African countries in the early 2000s, its pursuit of Africa's high concentrations of strategic minerals and significant deposits of petroleum and uranium emerged as a key driver of its increasing commercial engagement with the continent (Emelyanov, 2017). Russia's geopolitical goal to extend Europe's dependence on the import of its energy also inspired its quest for Africa's natural resources. Although self-sufficient in fuels and power generation, Russia's energy dependence and the plummeting reserves of oil and gas could negatively affect its recent economic growth and drive to become a world-leading energy producer. Under the Soviet system, Russian energy pricing and consumption policies called for subsidized prices far below world market prices and higher output volumes without conservation measures, which resulted in excessive consumption of energy, increased exports of natural gas and oil, and, more recently, in plummeting energy reserves (Fituni & Abramova, 2016).

With the current proven oil reserves of 60 billion barrels, Russia will have to rely on new discoveries of oil in order to meet the growing global demand for energy. Similarly, Europe's increasing consumption of energy and dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia puts pressure on the Kremlin to seek alternative sources of energy. Africa, with its rich endowment of crude oil reserves, natural gas deposits, and other minerals, is exerting a strong attraction for Russian energy companies (Ibidem, 2010). The African continent currently accounts for about 9.7 percent of the world proven oil reserves of 1.2 trillion barrels and its oil reserves are growing at an annual rate of 3.2 percent. With regard to natural gas, Africa's share of the global gas deposits of 181.46 trillion cubic meters is estimated at 7.8 percent (Klomegah, 2016). As Africa's comparative advantage in the scope and frequency of new discoveries is being courted by global energy consumption countries such as Russia, precautionary measures should be put in place to ensure that sustainable economic and social benefits accrue from natural resources exploitation. Increasing Russian investments in Africa could have both positive and negative outcomes. On the one hand, while such investments might represent significant economic opportunities for resource-rich African countries, there is a risk that, coupled with limited

domestic policies, they might generate negative social and environmental outcomes for Africa (Korendyasov & Shubin, 2019).

On the other hand, Russia's well-established expertise in extracting energy resources and advanced nuclear know-how presents a value-added opportunity for Africa (Korybko, 2015). It is worth noting that Russia is participating in tenders for the construction of the first nuclear power plants in Egypt and Nigeria, which have significant uranium reserves. Also, Russia's own experience with the problems that plagued its energy sector during the 1990s and its ability and knowledge to restructure the sector for improved management and higher productivity, could provide a salutary lesson to be learned by African countries (Kwinika, 2015).

According to Govella and Aggarwal (2017) Russia's membership in the G8 and its development commitments, offer African countries additional economic opportunities through opening its market, writing off African debt, and advocating for more debt reduction, especially for resource-rich African countries (Laruelle, 2019). To date, Russia has written off over US\$ 20 billion of Africa debt, and, like other G20members, has pledged to double its ODA to African countries (Latypov, 2019). In addition to negotiating debt reliefs, Russia could contribute to promoting African regional cooperation by making debt reliefs conditional upon African nations demonstrated commitment to regional energy sector cooperation like policy harmonization, trans border projects, free trade agreements, and integrated pipeline and transmission networks on the continent. Resource-based firms in both developed and emerging countries have been playing a central role in generating revenues for the national economies of oil- and resource-rich countries in Africa (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010).

However, those revenues do not always translate into long-term sustainable growth, nor do the revenues generated from natural resources production always contribute to human capital and social infrastructure development in African countries (Francis, 2018). Foreign investment companies should be called upon to create incentives or adopt measures to generate sustainable and shared benefits for resource producing countries in Africa. For instance, Russian resource-based firms should negotiate exploration and extraction agreements with the provision that a percentage of the investment should be earmarked for socioeconomic development like a trust

fund to be set up to support agro-business, education, health, and other forms of social welfare (Grifths, 2015).

### **3.7 Security for Economic Advantages**

The Russian actors active in Africa are mainly seeking to reap economic benefits in return for selling Russian goods and services in the security sector (Kazibwe, 2018). To achieve this, and to strengthen its position in Africa, the Kremlin and the MFA have used the machinery of state to first launch an information offensive (2014) and then to deploy delegations on the ground (2018), with the Foreign Minister (Sergey Lavrov) and Secretary of the National Security Council (Nikolai Patrushev) at their head. Russia has profoundly changed its narrative about Africa: from presenting the continent in a negative light before 2013, it began to emphasize its economic potential. This rhetorical shift was embodied by Mikhail Margelov, who served as the Kremlin's Special Representative for Africa until 2014 (Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, 2019)

When Vladimir Putin announced in 2017 that Egypt had signed a contract for Rosatom to build four nuclear reactors and to service them for 60 years, and when he received the CAR President, Faustin Archange Touadéra, at the St Petersburg Economic Forum in May 2018, he displayed an economic pragmatism that encompassed the whole of the African continent (Nordiska Africa Institute (2017). The Russian President is also seeking, implicitly, to advertise that Russia carries weight in a region where Western powers have traditionally held sway (Grifths, 2015). To effect change on the ground, the Deputy Foreign Minister and Kremlin Special Representative for Africa and the Middle East, Mikhail Bogdanov, oversaw the replacement of a number of his ambassadors in 2017, in Mozambique, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan and Cameroon (Oldberg, 2017).

The Central African Republic, where Sergei Lobanov had been ambassador from 2011 to 2019, represented a notable exception in this regard. Lobanov's longevity in office was due to a desire for a long-term approach towards Russian policy in the CAR (Nordiska Africa Institute, 2017). As a former Russian diplomat suggested, however, it might also be that the post of ambassador to CAR has never been particularly sought after. The Russian embassy in Bangui is understaffed and does little to advance the ambassadors career, unlike posts in Luanda and Nairobi. The fact

remains, though, that Lobanov enjoyed the advantage of understanding the local environment and the context of the current crisis: he probably helped put in place Russian soldiers and paramilitaries there at the beginning of 2018. Mikhail Bogdanov also took pains to prepare for the visit of his Minister from 5 to 9 March 2018 (Kazibwe, 2018).

Sergey Lavrov concentrated his efforts on Sub-Saharan Africa, where Russia is weakest economically, in the hope of clinching framework agreements (Klomegah, 2015). Lavrov visited Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia in succession. In each country, he promoted three pillars: a revival or increase in military and security cooperation; the opening of national economies to Russian investment and the relaunch of cultural and university exchanges. For Russia, it is about gaining a slice of the market, developing scientific and technical cooperation, no longer being excluded from the exploitation of natural resources and being seen as a major player in the fight against terrorism by African leaders (Korybko, 2016). In other words, Moscow wants to develop partnerships in which it exchanges security for economic advantage. Such partnerships depend on three characteristics that are common south of the Sahara: The inability of governments to maintain order and security on their own territory despite Western support like the Sahel, the Central African Republic; The weariness of some African public bodies towards Chinese lending and trade with China: Russia promotes, in contrast, a model that, on the face of it, appears more interesting (Mehmet, 2018).

In Mauritania, Ghana and even Ethiopia, governments have become disappointed with their Chinese partners as a result of loans whose terms are unfavourable in relation to the benefits that they provide (Laruelle, 2019). According to Russia, it wants to dispense with such onerous contracts and focus on the needs of the government in question; Lastly, the fear among most African leaders about Colour revolutions against which Moscow seems to be able to protect them, as its military intervention in Syria has shown. Moscow aspires to observer status in the G5 Sahel framework and pressed its claim with the five countries Lavrov visited, with later discussions held discreetly with Senegal and Mauritania (Latypov, 2019). More rhetorically but with no little impact on potential clients, Russia conjured up the spectre of colour revolutions with interlocutors at all levels: The Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, did so on 26 June 2018 as part of his fortnight-long tour of Angola and South Africa. The aim of

Patrushev's trip was to conclude cooperation agreements in the fight against Islamic terrorism and extremist groups, likely to prepare colour revolutions in these countries and in southern Africa more widely. Patrushev's travelling companion, Deputy Interior Minister Igor Zubov, recalled the part played by the United States and other outside powers in destabilizing Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, and in the Arab Springs. He called on Africa to resist hegemony of all sorts at a time when the framework of international relations built since 1945 was coming under strain (Lo, 2018).

According to a South African journalist who followed the Russian delegations, the Russian message was built around the need to find alternative solutions to those proposed by the West (Lo, 2018). In the five countries which Lavrov visited Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia relations are in the doldrums despite historic links with Moscow dating back to the Soviet era. The Kalashnikov assault rifle graces the coats of arms of Mozambique and Zimbabwe and many members of these countries elites were trained in the USSR. The new Angolan President, João Lourenço, is a graduate of the Lenin Military-Political Academy and, for many years, acted as Moscow's representative on arms sales and military training (Kwinika, 2015).

According to a French lobbyist who lives in Luanda, the current President has always been on the best of terms with the former Russian Defence Minister, Sergey Ivanov, as well as with his successor Sergey Shoigu (Lyons & Samatar, 2015). In spite of these promising historic links, however, the value of Russo-Angolan trade has not exceeded \$600 million per year over the last three years. Angolan trade was worth \$14 billion per year over the same period (Korybko, 2016). According to the same source, a large part of the trade with Russia takes place in the grey zone of the economy and it seems that Lavrov's visit was the signal for a change of approach in terms of respecting financial rules. Moscow wants to be able to tell success stories. To do so, it needs transparent markets, recognized as such by international financial institutions such as the World Bank. Although they have not disappeared entirely, briefcases stuffed with money are no longer commonplace: like China, Russia is concealing its hand behind increasingly complex instruments involving large state enterprises (Malsin, 2019).

In practice, this is about negotiating counter letters appended to contracts in which a government commits to give preference to a certain company in future operations, even to give that company opportunities it did not ask for (Lyons & Samatar, 2015). In CAR, although the true state of the country's natural resources is uncertain, Rosatom has already negotiated a privileged position, ensuring that it will be the first to explore for uranium deposits in the area of Bakouma. These entirely legal contracts often conceal kickbacks designed to pay off middlemen and other facilitators. Namibia, the second country on Lavrov's tour, is perceived by the Russian Foreign Ministry as a fraternal country that the USSR helped during the South African Border War (1966-1988) which pitted Angola against South Africa (Latypov, 2019).

In talks with his Namibian counterpart, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, Lavrov suggested that the UN Security Council should be reformed to open it up to African countries. In Namibia, as elsewhere, Lavrov was intent on increasing economic cooperation which had dwindled in the preceding years: the volume of trade had decreased from \$134 million in 2011 to \$24 million in 2017 (Kazibwe, 2018). Several contracts were signed for Russia to supply small arms to Namibia. The Minister also confirmed that Namibia had signed a letter expressing interest in working with Rosatom which has been conducting scientific and technical cooperation programmes since 2017 in the hope of building nuclear reactors. Nevertheless, these documents should be seen less as a contract concluded than a discussion begun. Likewise, the Russian company Sukhoi responded to a call for expressions of interest by the Namibian Airline Air Namibia with the Superjet 100: according to Sergey Lavrov, Sukhoi is amongst the favourites for the contract (Laruelle, 2019).

Lavrov's third stop was Mozambique where the priority was military cooperation over surface-to-surface missiles (Korendyasov & Shubin, 2019). He offered to assist local forces fighting Al-Shabab-affiliated groups and invited them to integrate their data base with the FSBs (Federal Security Service, one of the successors of the KGB). Once again, economics was central: Russia remains a second-order economic partner for Mozambique and bilateral trade fell short of \$100 million in 2017 (Francis, 2018). Moscow has therefore established an economic, scientific and technical commission whose first task, as part of a wider agreement, will be to give Mozambique access to Russian telecommunication satellites by 2020. The penultimate stop on Lavrov's tour



was Zimbabwe. During the Soviet period, Zimbabwe bought weapons from the Soviet military industrial complex but the current closeness between Russia and Zimbabwe is due to the special relationship Vladimir Putin enjoyed with the former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. Zimbabwe's new Presidential team plans to maintain good relations with Russia. Nevertheless, the volume of trade is decreasing significantly, falling from \$67 million in 2016 to \$53 million in 2017 (Govella & Aggarwal, 2017).

Russia is interested in Zimbabwe not only as a customer for its weapons, which Lavrov highlighted as a growth area, but also as a source of diamonds and rare metals that Russia could exploit (Fidan & Aras, 2017). So far, Moscow has not managed to break through and arms sales alone are not sufficient to drive an increase in trade. The Minister ended his trip in Ethiopia on the 120th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which was celebrated in the Russian embassy in Addis Ababa. Bilateral trade is in the red: having fallen by 50% between 2016 and 2017, Ethiopia's trade with Russia is worth just \$80 million per year, much less than its trade with the USA and China, its two main trading partners (Fidan, & Aras, 2017). Unlike in the other four countries he visited, however, Lavrov paid less attention to relaunching trade than to the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa and Djibouti, where most of Russia's competitors have military or logistical bases (Emelyanov, 2017).

## **CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES: RUSSIA ECONOMICAL RELATIONS**

The 1<sup>st</sup> summit for Russia and Africa happened at Sochi's Black Sea resort, Russia in 23<sup>rd</sup> to 24<sup>th</sup> of October the year 2019 where the African and Russian leaders debated strategic coordination amongst 2 sides on topics of joint interest, counting energy, investment, trade, technical coordination, developing alliances as well identifying fresh forms and areas of coordination. The co-chair was Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, and President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi of Egypt, AU chairman. According to Laruelle (2019) this Summit was an Economic Forum which focused on discovering fresh means of augmenting trade and economic cooperation. When the summit came to an end, many bilateral agreements amongst the governments of Africa and Russia were approved through signing particularly in the security, infrastructure and energy sectors.

Several analysts argue that the new interests of Russia in Africa is as a result of the aggravating role of Africa in affairs of the world, rapid technological advancements and growth of the economy witnessed within several nations in Africa (Korendyasov & Shubin, 2019). As well, Africa is viewed as the fresh frontier for trade, investment and economic development. In addition, Moscow is slowly focusing on Africa for purposes of projecting influence and power. The first Summit was portrayed as the biggest venture by Moscow in Africa from when SU collapsed nearly 3 decades back. The fresh engagement of Russia with Africa as well is viewed as Putin's tactic of countering the effect of emerging and traditional powers within Africa. The main powers of the world have gone deeper to cooperate with Africa by tactical multilateral contexts counting the summit for leaders for US-Africa Leaders' Summit, Africa-EU Partnership, Tokyo International Cooperation for African Development (TICAD), Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation, Africa-Arab Summit, India-Africa Summit amongst others (Ibidem, 2010).

A growing Russia sees Africa like a tactical geopolitical voting alliance, because a joint support of African nations at the multilateral meetings like the UN is important towards their interest realization (Kazibwe, 2018). Africa's increasing middle-class is establishing a voluminous fresh market for consumers which is pleasing to the corporations of Russia. The prospective of investment and trade between Africa and Russia has shown through an exponential increase of

185 per cent between the year 2005 and the year 2015. Moscow focuses above double its volumes of trade with Africa's continent to US\$ Forty billion within 5 years. Presently, trade among Africa and Russia is approximately US\$ twenty billion, approximately 10 percent of US\$ 200 billion of China (Emelyanov, 2017).

#### **4.1 Russia and South Africa**

Substantial quantity of agreements has been approved regulating different factors of development and trade concerns (Klomegah, 2016). These include agreements on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investment; double taxation avoidance; co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy; and the agreement between governments on co-ordination in exploring, extracting as well as processing of the minerals. Nonetheless, the implementation of these agreements falls short of the potential of the relations. The mineral resources development in particular platinum metals, manganese, gold, diamonds and sporadic elements of the earth is amongst the futuristic topics of co-operation between nations. South Africa is amongst the topmost partners of Russian in Africa's continent (Kazibwe, 2018).

In the year 2002 trade between countries reached \$138.1 million and nearly \$1 billion in the year 2017. The balance of trade is in the favor of SA. The exports of Russia in the year 2016 reached \$278.7 million (Deich, 2018). The exports entailed oil goods, manufacture of chemical sectors, agricultural stuff, equipment, wood, food, machinery and transport. Imports by Russia in the year 2016 reached \$685,600,000, comprising fertilizers, wood and Aluminium (Grifths, 2015). South Africa's exports entail food as vegetables and fruits, metals, raw materials, and beverages of non-alcoholic and alcoholic form. Big firms of Russia holding operations in SA entail the Renova Group (production and exploration of the manganese mineral), Norilsk Nickel (producing and Nickel mining), and the Evraz Group (producing steel and vanadium). SA firms serving in the country of Russia entail SABMiller (production of beer), Naspers (IT), and Mondi (pulp) (Govella & Aggarwal, 2017).

In the year 2012 Renova conducted \$350,000,000 investments in developing and modernizing the mining of manganese for the mutual project of United Manganese Kalahari (Francis, 2018). Presently Renova tends to be in preparation of an extensive project for renovating a factory for ferrous metals (estimated at \$250 million). As well, it has interests in solar energy park

development in SA. Norilsk Nickel runs the effective mining firm of Tati Nickel in the country of Botswana and the Nkomati Joint Venture in combination with Africa Rainbow Minerals in SA, and pursuing valuable opportunities for further developing their business. Already, the firm has invested above \$100, 000, 000 in reconstructing a nickel and copper factory. The Evraz Group owns shares in a leading vanadium supplier and production of metal in SA (Arkhangelskaya & Shubin, 2015).

Severstal and Renaissance Capital have a small involvement as shareholders in some of the ventures (Fidan & Aras, 2017). The March 2013 meetings also achieved results in aviation. There is a plan to build a joint helicopter and to establish a centre providing technical support for Russian helicopters (MI-17) in Johannesburg. Basic service agreements for the multipurpose helicopters, Mi-8 and Mi-17, were signed between Russia and South Africa in September 2012. The agreements resulted in the establishment of a joint centre for the maintenance of helicopters used by civilian companies in South Africa at end of March 2013 (Emelyanov, 2017). The memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed in August 2013 by the State Corporation, Rostekhnadzor, and the South African company, Denel, at MAKS-2013 in Zhukovsky, near Moscow, will expand the function of the previously created of weapons systems of combat vehicles. In addition, the parties will be able to share technologies (Fainberg, 2017).

In the area of nuclear energy co-operation, Russian OAO TechSnab Export and South African ESCOM Holdings Ltd signed a supply agreement of Russian-beneficiated uranium for the Koeberg power plant (Deich, 2018). The contract is valid for 10 years and was implemented in 2011. Bilateral co-operation is gaining momentum in the banking and financial sector. Several agreements have been signed on co-operation between the leading banks in both countries, including the Bank of Russia and The Reserve Bank of South Africa. Vnesheconom bank and Gazprom bank have offices in Johannesburg (De Waal, 2015).

Despite all this, co-operation in the economic sphere faces several difficulties associated with insufficient knowledge of Russian and African partners and their mutual capabilities and needs (Baev, 2018). The untapped potential lies in the development of direct economic ties between

representatives of small and medium-sized businesses, including through the subjects for the Russian Federation and provinces of South Africa.

The following points may be concluded. Although Russia recognises South Africa as one of the most promising markets in the developing world, and the most promising and reliable partner in Africa, the current trade and investment positions between Russia and South Africa are far below their potential. An increase in trade and investment flows is considered as the major area of strengthening co-operation between Russia and South Africa (Abbink, 2016). The high information costs of entering partner's markets for private business might be facilitated by public investments in developing integration infrastructure. The return on such improvements could be substantial, especially given the current low base. Although Russia South Africa relations are not strong at the moment, there are long-lasting historical connections which require a new injection (Arkhangelskaya & Shubin, 2015).

#### **4.2 Russia and Egypt**

Russia and Egypt are connected by a complex history of political and economic relations as well as multifaceted humanitarian ties (Comins & Yermolaev, 2018). The significance of Egypt to Russia is defined by its role as one of the leading political, economic and cultural centers of the Middle East and North Africa, and its place within the vast Islamic world. Egypt holds sea, land and air pathways of great international importance. Cooperation with Egypt would help Russia to pursue its interests in the Middle East region, as it is located close to Russia's southern borders in a conflict-prone region of enormous geopolitical importance (De Waal, 2015).

In terms of bilateral Egyptian-Russian relations, Russia is one of Egypt's largest trading partners. Trade exchange between Egypt and Russia has achieved remarkable growth in 2018, reaching \$ 7.66 billion, while Egypt's exports to Russia increased by 4.1% in 2018 to reach \$ 526.4 million compared to \$ 505.6 million in 2017 (Ball & Davies, 2018). This is due to the increase in Egyptian exports of agricultural crops as well as industrial commodities, especially pharmaceutical products and food and chemical industries. However, Egypt aspires to a greater increase in Egyptian exports to ease the large trade deficit between the two countries.

On the economic side, the Russian Industrial Zone project in the Suez Canal Economic Zone is Russia's first off-shore project. The Russian capital in the infrastructure projects of the project amounted to \$190 million, while the expected investment is about \$ 7 billion. Until now, about 55 Russian companies have expressed their keen in investing in this project, which will create about 150,000 jobs (Comins & Yermolaev, 2018). In recent months, the two countries have agreed to finance and supply 1,300 railway wagons to develop the railway sector in Egypt and discuss joint manufacturing steps for these wagons, as well as ways of enhancing cooperation and coordination between Egypt and Russia in African markets (Ball & Davies, 2018).

On the bilateral level, the two countries signed on December 11, 2017, in Cairo an agreement to establish Egypt's nuclear power project in the Dabaa region (Deich, 2018). This project is the largest joint venture between Cairo and Moscow since the High Dam since establishing the High Dam project that has economic, financial and investment dimensions. It also helps in the transfer of advanced technology in this field, which Egypt needs in the framework of an integrated energy strategy that will make Egypt a regional and global center for the production and circulation of energy with all its components and renewable and non-renewable sources (Fainberg, 2017).

Since 2014, Egypt has been increasingly turning to Russia for arms sales. The decision to do so was initially triggered by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi disappointment with Washington after the 2013 removal of Islamist President Mohammed Morsi's regime (Faul, 2015). When the Obama Administration halted the delivery of previously contracted weapons systems including F-16 fighter jets and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and canceled joint military exercises between Egyptian and American armed forces, al-Sisi and Putin started to talk.

The military developments go beyond arms sales, with strategic cooperation increasing as well. In November 2017, the two countries inked an agreement during a visit by the Russian Defense Minister to Cairo that allows for the joint use of each other's airspace and military airbases (Fainberg, 2017). The five-year deal, which could be extended further if both parties agree, has raised eyebrows in Washington. If implemented, it would reinforce Russia's military presence in

the Middle East and create a potential launching pad for wider Russian operations in North Africa.

According to Emelyanov (2017) the countries militaries have also held several joint exercises in that time period. In 2015, Russia and Egypt held joint naval drills off the Mediterranean Egyptian port of Alexandria. In 2016, Egyptian and Russian paratroopers participated in a joint military exercise titled Defenders of Friendship, the first of its kind in Africa, which was followed by a similar exercise in Russia in 2017. Egypt will again host Russian and Egyptian paratroopers in 2018, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Moscow and Cairo are sharing strategic and political interests to promote regional stability based on strong national states. Egyptian-Russian cooperation over Syria and Libya goes beyond any narrow definition of joint interests to encompass stability across the Middle East. It is also about opening up economic avenues for the eventual reconstruction of both countries, in terms of infrastructure and in terms of armaments.<sup>20</sup> The situation in Libya, for Egypt it is a direct security issue, given the more than 1,000km western border Egypt shares with Libya and Cairo's ongoing war with militant groups in Sinai (Comins & Yermolaev, 2018). Egypt is naturally concerned about preventing an influx to the peninsula of any militants displaced from Sinai. For Russia it is a matter of expanding its strategic presence across the Middle East in countries that Moscow traditionally considered part of its sphere of influence in a region that has a considerable Western presence.

#### **4.3 Russia and Angola**

Compared to the Soviet era, trade between Russia and Angola is now quite minimal. In 2016, exports from Russia to Angola amounted to US\$567.9 million and Angolan exports to Russia amounted to just US\$14,942 (Baev, 2018). Russian business in Africa has a history of project implementation mistakes that have skewed Russia's business image on the continent. In Angola the challenges lie mostly in a poor understanding of the Angolan context as well as the lack of experience and skills of Russian business in international markets, especially the African trade environment (Deich, 2018).

Russian business often loses when competing with more experienced players on the African continent (Fidan & Aras, 2017). There are, however, a few stories of success, mostly by state owned enterprises. VTB successfully entered the Angolan market in 2006 via a partnership with a consortium of local private capital with close links to the Angolan government. This joint venture gave birth to Banco VTB-Africa SA in 2007, then the largest foreign-owned bank in Angola, in which the VTB initially held a 66% share. VTB-Africa was created as an investment bank targeting companies in the fields of natural resources, energy, telecommunications, construction and retail (Fainberg, 2017).

Another Russian company with a significant footprint in Angola is state-owned ALROSA. Unlike VTB though, ALROSA is a long-standing actor in the diamond industry in Angola with a major stake in the Catoca project (Lunda Sul province), one of the largest diamond-producing fields in the world (De Waal, 2015). Russia's engagement in the Angolan diamond industry dates back to the early 1980s through ALROSA's Soviet predecessor, state diamond company, Yakutalmaz, when it conducted a geological survey and feasibility study of Catoca mine for the Angolan government. In addition to its diamond exploration activities, ALROSA has also developed the hydroelectric power plant on the Chicapa river (Lunda Sul province), commissioned by President dos Santos, who attended the launch ceremony on 12 November 2007 (Ball & Davies, 2018). ALROSA also installed an electrical grid to power Catoca mine and the provincial capital of Saurim as well as surrounding villages. The hydroelectric project put in place a reliable power supply to Catoca, which was running on petrol generators before, thereby significantly reducing production costs (Comins & Yermolaev, 2018).

One of the most important assets and competitive advantages of Russia in Angola is the influential political capital it still enjoys, which is rooted in the support it provided to the liberation struggle and then to the ruling party during the civil war, coupled with the capacitation of successive generations of civil and military cadres. Many high-level cadres in the government and armed forces graduated from Soviet/Russian universities, speak fluent Russian, and remain very attuned to Russian culture.



#### **4.4 Russia and Nigeria**

Nigeria is an economic powerhouse in West African region. Nigeria is one of the Africa's fastest growing economies and it boasts the largest population. Under President Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria has taken practical steps to continue bolstering economic and strategic ties with Russia. Interestingly, Russia and Nigeria's two-way trade remains minimal, far below expected level, given the fact that Russia is the biggest market in the Eurasian region and Nigeria the biggest market in Africa (Fituni, L. & Abramova, 2016).

Relations between Nigeria and Russia can be traced back to the former Union of the Soviet of Social Republics era when diplomatic relations between the two countries were established. Since then, economic relations between both countries have steadily developed with a number of leading Russian companies establishing their presence in Nigeria. Russian investment in Nigeria covers such areas as energy, iron and steel, and hydrocarbon. The Russian-Nigerian Business Council was also established to oversee economic activities between the two countries. It is also a platform for the two countries to sit down and draw up agreements and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on how to conduct effective businesses and investment in both countries. Now, new hopes in Moscow and Abuja are that the countries annual commercial ties have to be increased rapidly to billions of dollars during the next few years.

Furthermore, Russia has expressed deep interest in Nigeria, highly pledging to build nuclear power plants, petroleum pipelines, railways and infrastructure. There is high optimism among business elite and, of course, conditions for raising especially Russia-Nigerian economic cooperation. Russia plans to help Nigeria explore for oil and gas. Nigeria has expressed interest in Russia, helping it build nuclear power plants, petroleum pipelines, railways and other infrastructure. Both Russia and Nigeria have a wealth of minerals and some could be the basis of additional commerce between the two. Nigeria's natural resources include gold, bauxite, zinc, tantalum, iron ore and coal (Govella, K. & Aggarwal, 2017).

But, the major challenge facing investors from both sides of the divide is dearth of information on each other's business environment. This has, over the years, created a condition of uncertainty and misgivings among prospective investors. As part of the initiatives to contribute to revamping the Nigerian economy, Nigerians under the auspices of Nigerians in Diaspora Organization in Europe (NIDOE), the Russian Chapter in collaboration with Russia-Nigeria Business Council,

Institute of African Studies and Russian ministries and agencies have adopted corporate strategies in identifying and wooing potential Russian businesses and industry directors to invest in Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Within the context of strengthening the entire relations, it is also necessary to foster cooperation with support from the Intergovernmental Russian-Nigerian Mixed Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, and also by stepping up direct contacts between members of the Russian and Nigerian business communities as suggested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

#### **4.5 Russia and Kenya**

Through its geographical factors, Kenya as a nation is wealthy of natural resources, Mombasa and Nairobi being commercial centers of East Africa. The economy of Kenya happens to be the greatest in terms of GDP in Central and Southeast Africa. Majority of the investors from overseas make Kenya an investment country of their choice as a result of the social and political stability and acts like a doorway to the growing market in the East Africa. The foreign relationship of Kenya has continued to increase, mostly focused on boosting economic collaboration with the overseas nations. Conversely, Kenya happens to be amongst the nations of Africa that face attacks from groups of terrorists for instance Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab several times.

Consequently because of that and some other matters, Kenya has become closed associate of US specifically on the acts of countering terrorism. For instance, Uganda, above 3,000 peacekeeping troops of Kenya in the nation of Somalia still is a player of the AMISOM (AMISOM, 2016). However, Russia holds cordial and longstanding relationships with the nation of Kenya from the date of independence that is 1963 (present day Ghana, 2015). Trade amid the 2 nations, nonetheless, is comparatively limited, summing about \$200 million every year (RWR Advisory Group 2016,). Regardless of restrained financial and economic activity amid the two nations, Russia showed transformed interest on Kenya subsequent to President Kenyatta's election in 2013.

Shortly from when he became the elected president, his 1<sup>st</sup> visit abroad was Moscow, afterwards Beijing, demanding closer relationships in trade. Based on that linking, Russia established a fresh

organization in 2015, known as Russian-African Forum, that was established for nurturing fresh business relationships amid the 2 nations (RWR Advisory Group, 2016). As well, the senate speaker of Russia Valentina Matviyenko stated that her nation saw Kenya being a tactical partner within Africa and tended to be keen in seeing the relationships amongst the 2 nations boosted (Citizen News, 2015).

Just as many of the nations in Africa, Kenya buy a noteworthy sum of arms from Russia and some of their specialists in security have undergone training through the training scholarships and programs sponsored by Russia. There has been considerable growth from Kenyas buying of the arms from Russia recently, despite Russia still holds as one of the sources of procurement for the nation (RWR Advisory, Group 2016). In addition, in 05/30, in the eight international nuclear energy forum in the year 2016, carried out in Moscow, the Nuclear energy company for Russian nation and Kenyan council of Nuclear Energy conducted the signing of the memorandum for cooperation in tranquil use of the nuclear energy (Bangladesh new on Energy, 2016). Like the relationships with the nation of Uganda, regardless of the growing relations in the strategic fields like nuclear power and natural resources, it would be pointed out that there is a high unlikeliness for the relationships between Russia and Kenya go above economic aspect, in Africa, as a result of the relationships of Kenya with the USA.

Trade is important in the Russia-Kenya joint cooperation. Presently, the trade between Russia and Kenya is meek in comparison to overall trade amongst Kenya and some chief economic supremacies like the US, India and China. Based on Economic Survey of Kenya (2019), the joint balance of trade between Russia and Kenya was some Ksh 23.2 billion favoring Russia in the year 2018. Kenyas worth of exports to the country Russia were approximated at Ksh 8.6 billion, Ksh8.0 billion, Ksh 7.0 billion, Ksh 8.1 billion and Ksh 7.1 billion in years 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015 and 2014, respectively. Conversely, the imports value of Russia was approximated at Ksh 31.7 billion in 2018, Ksh 36.1 billion in 2017, Ksh 24.3 billion in 2016, Ksh 28.6 billion in 2015 and Ksh 23.1 in 2014 billion. The imports from Russia to the nation of Kenya entail beverages, wheat, machinery, steel and iron, fertilizers, pulp articles, paperboard and paper. The exports of Kenya' to the country of Russia entail coffee, products of horticulture, tobacco, spices and pulses amongst others (Mungai, 2019).

The corporations of Russia like Tafnet, Rosneft, Lukoil, Rostec, Gazprom, and Rosatom have invested considerably in the continent of Africa's gas and oil ore rich nations. As well, Russia has a noteworthy presence of military across Africa since its amongst the chief arms supplier to other African nations. Moscow is intending to reinforce the military fight capacity of Africa by providing training to the military. Presently, Russia has Military Technical Cooperation (MTC) contracts with more than 30 nations. As well, Russia is involving some countries of Africa in potential collaboration in nuclear power factories developments for peaceful reasons.

When the summit is concluded, its crucial for the nation of Kenya to be looking for prospective benefits for escalating coordination with Moscow. There have been cordial relationships between the nation of Kenya and Russia from December 1963 on achieving independence. In the period of the Cold War, Kenya happened to be a member of Non-Aligned Movement, thus held good relationships with SU. During the early ages of the independence attained by Kenya, Moscow did not just give youthful Kenyans scholarships for studying in SU but as well participated in development of infrastructure counting funding the building of the previous Nyanza Provincial Hospital presently, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Teaching and Referral Hospital.

Kenya is highly held in the policy of Russia as a leader within the continent and an economic development and growth engine. That has been portrayed by high delegation level visits to Moscow and Nairobi. Sergey Lavrov, the Minister for Russia's Foreign Affairs, Valentina Matviyenko senate speaker of Russia, and President Putin's exceptional envoy to Africa and Middle East, Mikhail Bogdanov, are amongst high state authorities of Russia who have visited Kenya. Kenyas high delegations level has visited Moscow for formal reasons a number of times.

At the sidelines of the summit, President Kenyatta and his host, the Russian leader held bilateral talks that touched on trade, investment, tourism, science and technology, training and education, security and defence, tourism and people to people interactions that would be imperative in enhancing shared development and modernization agenda of the two countries. Kenyan and Russian delegations also resolved to establish a Russian-Kenya Business Council that would be critical in overseeing the implementation of joint trade and investment programmes. President Kenyatta reiterated that entrenching bilateral and multilateral partnership would enable the two countries achieve faster progress in trade, investment, security and other sectors. Renegotiation

of the Bilateral Air Services Agreement to establish direct cargo flights between the two countries was also discussed.

There is great demand for tea, products of horticulture as well as other goods in Russia. Kenya can make most out of the improved bilateral relationships towards expanding its coffee and tea exports, and products of horticulture to Russia. As many corporations of Russia target Kenya for opportunities of investment, the state authorities are supposed to enhance the environment of investments since it is not just going to improve trade amongst the 2 nations but as well contribute in technology transfer to Kenya. Improved coordination with the gas and oil oriented companies would as well be quite significant to the infant hydrocarbon sub-sector of Kenya. The sector of tourism would as well gain from improved alliances amongst the 2 nations while Kenya hastens diversification of market sources of tourism having target on the tourists from Russia who happen to be preferring North Africa and Middle East, amongst others. This needs Kenya to be offering products of tourism that are appealing to fresh market source of tourism.

Russia acknowledges the role of Kenya in promotion of area security, stability and peace through political intermediation, involvement in operations for peacekeeping within the region, fighting counter to global piracy, terrorism as well as other criminal operations across borders. Moscow has put in noteworthy attempts through training provision to the security staff of Kenya. It's essential that the nation of Kenya discovers fresh areas where support from Russia would be important. For example, Kenya would look for technology and experience in Moscow to address security menace that terrorists pose, transnational associates and cybercriminals. Kenya would as well would pursue the support of Moscow in the process of stabilizing Somalia.

Lastly, as the 2 nations serve towards establishing Russian-Kenya Commission on Technological, scientific and Economic Cooperation, the commitment of Kenya to the fresh partnership level is supposed to be directed by the nation's major state interests counting economic, social growth as well as technological shift of the nation, protecting regional integrity, and Vision 2030 and Big Four agenda's realization (Mungai, 2019).

## **CHAPTER FIVE: THE RUSSIA AFRICA SUMMIT**

### **5.1 The Sochi Russia Africa Summit**

The 1<sup>st</sup> summit for Russia and Africa happened at Sochi's Black Sea resort, Russia in 23<sup>rd</sup> to 24<sup>th</sup> of October and the co-host was Vladimir Putin the president of Russia and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi the president of Egypt. Forty-three heads of state or government were in attendance. Putin emphasized "state sovereignty" and Russian willingness to offer aid or trade deals "without political or other conditions", said that "an array of Western countries are resorting to pressure, intimidation and blackmail of sovereign African governments," against which Russia was well suited to help African states push back. The two-day event will see more than 3,000 delegates from across Russia and Africa to discuss an array of topics from nuclear energy to mineral extraction (Sucuoğlu & Stearns, 2019).

All 54 African states sent a representative to the meeting, including 43 heads of state or government, according to Kremlin advisor Yuri Ushakov. In opening the summit, Putin announced that Russian trade with African nations has doubled in the past five years to more than \$20 billion. And after announcing that he expected it to double again within the next five years, he reportedly used the first day of the summit in Sochi to talk defense cooperation with Ethiopia, uranium trade with Namibia and even space technology with Uganda's president (Sergunin, 2019).

The centerpiece of the Russia-Africa Summit was a large number of Memoranda of Understanding, intended to facilitate Russian trade with African countries, especially in the fields of energy infrastructure and military equipment. For example, Moscow is increasing its level of investment in areas such as Ethiopia, which has agreed to the Russian nuclear company Rosatom building two 12,000 MW nuclear reactors (Oldberg, 2017). The Central African Republic is in talks over a proposal to host a Russian military base, while Nigeria has signed a deal to receive 12 Mi-35 attack helicopters; all in all, Russia intends to sell US\$4 billion worth of arms on the continent. On the energy front, Russian state development bank, VEB, has invested in a co-operative deal over an oil pipeline in the Republic of the Congo, as well as financing a refinery with Morocco's MYA (Energy Sputnik News, 2020).

These projects are just a small sample of the plans that Moscow is hoping will double Russian-African trade over the next several years. If the comments by South African Public Investment Minister Pravin Gordhan are anything to go by, the Russian initiatives are welcome: Anybody who gets business going, either from the Russian point of view or the African point of view, in the medium term, will benefit (Öztürk, 2016). Although some may question the effectiveness of Russia's deals with Africa, given that the value of its trade with the continent, at around US\$18 billion, is dwarfed by that of the US, EU and China at US\$204 billion, the reality is that Moscow's deal is meant to achieve political and symbolic gains, not just physical outcomes. In that sense, Russia will be in competition with China. Indeed, to escape the political isolation of 2014, Putin is working to forge closer economic and security relations, as well as supporting the various leaders in Africa. That gives Russia more political legroom and a greater aura of legitimacy on the international stage. Further, having the backing of over 40 states could give Russia additional voting rights in the United Nations, which also plays into Putin's attempts to restore Russia's standing and reputation (Raviot, 2018).

Still, the resilience of growth that the region enjoys also mirrors the escalating diversification of the growth sources and partners in trade in a transforming global landscape for trade of a growing South, in which India and China 2 BRICS nations alongside Russia have turned out as the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> single biggest partners in trade with Africa (Schulz, 2018). Though in a sphere where international trade has greatly been subjugated by manufactured products with rising technological content, maintaining strong rates of growth within Africa and improving its integration in the international economy is going to need increasing innovation, technology and energy investment. Additionally, to economic and physical infrastructure, to boosting increased value as well as driving manufacturing yield (Sergunin, 2019).

In this framework, closing the infrastructure loopholes of Africa to increase productivity is in particular critical. Investment of Russia in major strategic industries and sectors like aviation, petrochemicals and rail are not just going to sustain the economic growth in Africa, it also has the potential of accelerating the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area AfCFTA. For Russia, this has created three primary openings: prestige, reputation and political clout. It is no secret that Putin has resented the dominance of the US-led liberal international

order, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The recent series of missteps and miscalculations by Washington has greatly damaged the reputation and credibility of the United States. For Putin, who was an international pariah for five years, such US failings represent an opportunity to regain influence and improve Russia's damaged standing in the world (Suslov, 2017).

## **5.2 Dealing with Infrastructure Bottlenecks**

Even though there has been touting of the AfCFTA as the game-changer with prospects of creating the hugest single market for services and goods across the globe, forging fresh partnerships for trade towards attracting more FDI to support development of infrastructure and manufacturing yield expansion is going to be crucial for its effective execution. Despite digitalization is transforming systems of delivery and payment, geography maintains as the determiner of services and goods flows. And for Africa in which approximately 1/3 of nations tend to be landlocked, handling the infrastructure challenges will be useful to strengthen the cross-border trades as well as accelerating economic revolutionary process required for furthering African nations integration in the international economy.

Investors, counting the ones from the nation of Russia tend to be making most of the opportunities for growth that the extensive economies of scale tend to be creating as well as higher ROI the fresh bloc of trading and combined market are going to bring. At present, multinational companies are reacting to fresh incentives linked with AfCFTA, with Peugeot and Volkswagen declaring their focus to building assembly and manufacturing factories in Kenya and Rwanda. The partnership that has continued to grow between Russia and Africa provides further capacity for Russia to connect to the increasing investors ranks and taking advantage of the fresh opportunities for investment and trade linked with AfCFTA.

## **5.3 Russia's Competitive Advantage**

Nonetheless, whereas greater returns and growth opportunities are supposed to be important under AfCFTA, the investors of Russia are going to cope to the fresh and progressively quite competitive economic surrounding in the area. There is increased growth of interest for Africa not only from the traditional alliances, but as well and progressively, from emergent economies



that are developing. That is probably amongst the critical problems which burgeoning Russia may encounter when reengaging and snowballing economic coordination with Africa. Though the expertise of Russia around technology, infrastructure and energy where its internationally competitive would establish the excavating cooperation levels, on a really win-win alliance and reinforce the basis of resilience for growth in Russia and Africa, in a zero-sum international trade and policy setting (Mungai, 2019).

The 1<sup>st</sup> high-level Investment Summit for Russia-Africa, that is planned to hold in Black Sea city of Sochi in Russia later in the year, is going to give the chance for introducing Africa's corporate and sovereign leaders to their counterparts of Russia and increase subjects of common interest having the goal to more solidification of the engagement level for a win-win alliance. The reality that a big number of the African leaders have healthily received the predictions of the event. There are quite high anticipations. For a continent in which funding of infrastructure requirements are above \$100bn per year and in cases where yearly gaps for trade funding are very large, the summits significance is going not to concern the expected contracts quantity for signing, but instead the size and scale of deals as well as their significance to development and growth preferences. This is supposed to be the standard for informing the summit planning and inspect its impact on development and output (Sergunin, 2019).

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In case there's a lesson learnt for years from the experience of Russia in the zero-sum game domain of contending interests in geopolitics, it's the robust relation between the security of the state and development of its economy. Actually, as the deceased UN Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan pointed out during his speeches that no form of development can occur while

there's no security, and there can't be security with no development. With respect to that the deepening and renewed alliance between Africa and Russia is also supposed to aim at strengthening the basis of state security, to place Africa in an irreparable path for growth in the course of execution of AfCFTA.

#### **5.4 Moments in History**

The Sochi meeting, and most largely, the fresh reconciliation is as well going to give the chance of introducing Russia to Africa during a period where increasing stress on competition and economics from excavating figure of development alliances has probably concerned the historical relations which Russia did play in the movements of liberation, placing on the best side of the history of Africa (Ramani, 2019). In reality, regardless of the robust historical relationships, very several Russians and Africans, particularly amongst the youthful generation, recall sacrifices that Russia made in Africa in the course of battle for independence. Nonetheless, in Africa's continent, that historical incapacity of remembering the aid that Russia gave is a fraction of a wider culture problem as well as historical forgetfulness, that featured the post-independence period.

For instance, the freedom fighter's legacy and that of Patrice Lumumba, the 1st post-colonial Prime Minister of DR Congo is quite live in the country of Russia, in which a high-status university happened to be titled after him, as compared in DR Congo, leave alone the other countries, in which the leaders have not erected one monument for his memory and honour (Pirio & Pittelli, 2019). The summit of Russia-Africa in Sochi is thus going to be the 1<sup>st</sup> stage on a journey for elevating recognition as well as increased salutation of much more salutations of many more significant contributions that Russia made like essential instants in the history of Africa. With respect to that, creation of the ideal environments for a joint cooperation and understanding not solely the corporate and economic level, but as well in the cultural and educational sphere, is going to be a significant result of this 1<sup>st</sup>-ever Summit for Russia-Africa. This meeting will be one which will establish a robust basis for a win-win alliance and ensuring continuity of history from one generation to the other (Oldberg, 2019).

Having said that, the high anticipations of Russia might be overshadowed by several tentative blocks. Firstly, it entails lacking a general strategy for Russia and aforementioned Kremlin rhetoric all the same. Regardless of some apparently pivotal steps, a big number of observers contend that to present, Russia hasn't tabled any systemic or coherent forward-looking clarification of their behavior mode within Africa. Other experts of Russia as well demand the present ruling leaders of the nation not to do an overestimation of SUs actual benefit within Africa in the course of Cold War: both military-technical and economic cooperation between Africa's countries happened to be somewhat like one-way path instead of jointly beneficial cooperation (Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Russian Federation, 2018).

Besides, sources from Russia state from the actuality that contemporary Russia's increasing balance of trade with Africa's continent is accredited to cooperation with SA, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt. Trade involvements with some other actors in Africa still holds very low and there's unlikeliness of experiencing intense growth in forthcoming future. Conversely, as Andrey Emelyanov, a professor in Oriental Studies department at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) notes, openly speaking, Russia presently does not have foreign policy plan to Africa and that which they got are only mutual phrases they don't know that which they need from Africa and their state interests in the continent (Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Russian Federation, 2019).

The 2<sup>nd</sup> major hindrance is Soviet paths continuation, mirrored in the incapacity of Moscow of converting present attempts to economically and profitable viable gains. Thirdly is the restrained competitive edge of Russia: apart from comparatively effective military-technical coordination, the leadership of Russia had to broadly depend on sentimental contentions, directed to military, political and economic aid given by SU to Africa's states during the post-colonial span. Though, there's a reason for believing that through using these contentions, Russia is actually enticing itself to a trick. In denoting the Soviet cooperation model, the side of Russia is unintentionally inspiring African nations to espousing the former practices that Russia is going to be incapable of sustaining. Putin's intensified rhetoric, together with the magnificent reception and gala of the foreign guests in Sochi last week, might thus, prospectively convey the incorrect message to leaders of Africa (Malsin, 2019).

Finally, the last declaration of the summit is outstanding in its vagueness and wording. Rather than content related to business, the document is infused with romanticism and penned in a mode more corresponding with Cold War period. Seemingly, regardless of the facing of change, thinking of Russia during cooperation with Africa's continent reserved a lot of its old essence.

## **5.5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.5.1 Summary of the findings**

The Russian administration struggles for a multi-polar world system against the US pressure for a uni-polar system. Finding new allies in various regions has become quite important to Russia. Nevertheless, several developments damaged, if not destroyed altogether, the bridges between Russia and the West. These include NATO's continuous eastward expansion; Russia's disappointment during the 1998 Balkan Crisis; criticisms about Russia during the second Chechnya war in 1999; Russia's failure to prevent the current war in Iraq; serious Western opposition to Russia-Iran relations on the nuclear field and Kosovo's independence.

In its efforts to construct a multi-polar world system, Russia is willing to find and maintain friendly relations with countries that would support its cause. The basis of the close relations with the mentioned African countries is the legacy of prominent relations during the Soviet Union. As an outcome of its pragmatist policy, Russia seems successful in reconciling the diverging interests in different regions with the countries it wants to follow close relations.

Regional integrations are gaining speed in world politics. Africa is no exception to this trend. The most attractive organisation is the African Union, though it has yet to prove itself to the world. However, if it reaches its aims in the long run, Africa's weight and influence in international politics and world public opinion will undoubtedly grow. Russia has quite often benefited from the strategy of evaluating all possible scenarios before taking any action in its conduct of foreign policy. Similar to the case with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Russia has achieved an accredited status in the African Union as well. Russia's attempts to strengthen its relations with the African Union can be regarded as one of its long-term investments in Africa.

Russia seems eager to enable its gradually growing service and industrial sectors to compete in regional and global markets, and to find markets and raw materials for the goods it produces. The heritage of the Soviet Union period provides an even more auspicious atmosphere. Russia's weapons and military technology constitute an important dimension of its economy, and Africa is a significant market for this industry as African armies still predominantly use Soviet-made arms. Russia's new foreign policy road map requires establishing much better relations with African countries.

Therefore, Russia will probably penetrate the continent in a more organised and powerful manner, even though this will never reach the level of the African explosion of the 1960s. In doing this, Russia will have to derive lessons from its experience during the 1990s. Russia-Africa relations have the potential to contribute to Russia's achievement of its priority national interests.

The primary justification for this optimism is the closeness of opinion between Russia and African countries on the construction of a new world order, and shared attitudes between the two on major international issues. There will be increasing involvement of the politically and economically powerful actors of the world such as the US, Germany, United Kingdom France, China, Japan, India, and Brazil on the African continent. These countries, with varying degrees, are willing to use Africa's resources, play a major role in African economies, make African countries policies closer to their own, and be able to intervene in developments as needed. Being left out of the game within the context of this growing African trend would mean being left out of the game in the international stage. Because Russia wants to achieve its former prestige among the world's nations, Russia will definitely return to Africa. Recent developments already show this to be true.

### **5.5.2 Conclusion**

Some challenges still exist in Russia-Africa relations. A major one is probably a mix of negative perceptions and inadequate knowledge about the emerging business potential that have an impact on trade development. Also African countries are closely tied to Western economies by language, culture and history. Beside language obstacles, there are still perceptions about the unstable political situation, poor governance, quality of management and services. Until now

Russia lacked instruments of engagement with African countries, like Africa summits, specialized NGOs, bilateral intergovernmental commissions, special institutions for economic cooperation with Africa. For example, the number of binational commissions Russia has with Sub-Saharan governments is limited to ten: Angola, Ghana, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Congo (Brazzaville), Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia and South Africa.

Russia needs to court for development of a specific Africa focused policy and also craft a more integrated approach between the public and private sectors in engaging opportunities there. But the situation seems to be improving. Russian businesses interested in Africa have taken small steps such as, for instance, the 2009 formation of the Coordinating Committee on Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan African Countries (AfroCom), chaired by Vladimir Dmitriev under the auspices of the Russian Chamber of Trade and Industry.

The low cooperation between Russia and the African continent has two primary sources: firstly, there has not been as long a historical relationship between Russia and the African continent as there has not seen Africa as a business destination for a long period of time. Nonetheless, Russian involvement in Africa must be welcomed as an additional or alternative balancing force to Western and Asian powers. The poor and low level of infrastructural development in Africa constitutes a huge additional potential business opportunity for Russian construction companies to step in. Energy and food production are further sectors Russians are well-equipped to develop. Over the past few years' summits have become increasingly common and interactive dialogue involving African elites in politics, business and intellectual life could be used as bridges to stimulate more meaningful. Russia could learn from it. What Russia really needs is a multilayered agenda for Africa.

Every reengagement effort since 2000 has reinforced the Kremlin's relations with African governments and boosted economic and commercial partnerships between Russia and the continent. Although the current volume of trade between Russia and Africa is relatively low considering the former Soviet Union's total trade volume with the world, the growing trend of commercial activities between the two regions has reasserted Moscow's geo-economic strategic

ambitions. Moreover, Russian firms seeking greater access to African natural resource fields are playing a key role in renewing and expanding Russia's sphere of influence in Africa.

While Russia's search for alternative sources of energy provided the impulse for its new engagement with Africa, the Kremlin's goal of remaining the world's largest energy exporter propelled Russian corporations into the continent. Russia's pursuit of strategic natural resources will benefit African countries; not only from a revenue-generating point of view, but also because of the catalytic role the increased investments will have on socioeconomic growth and development. Russia's expertise in energy exploration and production, and its membership in the G20 present an opportunity for African governments to work jointly with Russian companies and international organizations such as the African Development Bank in order to ensure a strong and constructive linkage between Russia's energy interests and sustained economic growth in the continent.

### **5.5.3 Recommendations**

Fostering greater co-operation between Russia and Africa will require a stronger commitment from both sides in terms of institutionalization of the relationship. There is a clear need for more efficient mechanisms to co-ordinate bilateral co-operation and ensure implementation. This could entail the creation of follow-up mechanisms on the ground as well as better articulation between policymaking and implementation. More personnel and serious investment in capacitation will be required.

The expansion of bilateral trade in the future will depend on finding niche areas where there are competitive advantages; improving transportation and communication networks; engaging in proactive economic diplomacy on both ends; and creating financial instruments like export credit facilities to boost trade flows much like Brazil and China have done.

For Africa the challenge will be to ensure a better balance as trade flows expand. Concrete measures to expand bilateral trade with Russia should wait until other sectors of the economy are more consolidated, such as agriculture, mining, manufactures and services. To advance this goal, Africa should work on attracting investment from Russia into these sectors. Possibilities are numerous, such as drawing Russian investment into minerals exploration beyond diamonds,

which entails local beneficiation before exportation; and machinery assembly or electronic appliance factories. In this scenario, Russia Africa investment flows appear to have greater potential for expansion than trade in the short term. However, in order to promote Russian private-investment flows into Africa, the countries need to improve its investment framework. Other measures could include the creation of a dynamic bilateral business council, headed by well-known and well-connected businessmen on both sides, and staffed with capable individuals.

Moscow would benefit from developing a more assertive and comprehensive economic statecraft to support the expansion of its small and medium enterprises into promising but difficult markets in Africa, such as Angola and South Africa. This would involve the creation of financial instruments to incentivize its enterprises, which should be articulated with policy incentives and a very proactive economic diplomacy. Russia can also improve its engagement strategy in Angola by learning from other emerging economies that seem to be performing better in Africa, such as China and Brazil. Naturally this would entail adjusting those strategies to Moscow's capacity, competitive advantages and interests in the region.

Moscow can also benefit from partnering up with other emerging powers present in Africa. Although there is competition among them, there is room for co-operation. To achieve this, Russia can use existing platforms, such as the BRICS.

Africa needs to be more proactive in order to avoid becoming a passive recipient in the bilateral and multilateral relationship. To push through its development agenda, African countries should maintain a dynamic agency and share the responsibility of expanding bilateral relations with Russia. This can be done by taking the initiative in creating bilateral mechanisms and instruments, so as to have equal control in the relationship and to ensure its interests will be met. To this end, Africa needs to articulate these goals with its own national development and industrialization plans. This involves putting in place policies, regulations and institutions to maximize Africa's potential benefit, namely by channeling Russian resources into technology and skills development, and into the diversification of its economy, taking into consideration Russia's competitive advantages over Africa's other partners.



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